EC-1: factor _fingerprint_of(public_key) so encrypt_aes_key_with_rsa fingerprints the
already-loaded key instead of re-opening/parsing the file. encrypt_data rejects a
non-dict/str with a clear TypeError (was: opaque .encode() AttributeError); decrypt_data
raises ValueError on a malformed blob (was: raw KeyError); a wrong-password PEM load gives
a clearer message; reencrypt's dict-only traversal (list-nested blobs skipped) documented.
Signed-off-by: disqualifier <dev@disqualifier.me>
- encrypted OpenSSH private key with no password now raises ValueError (not a raw
TypeError from load_ssh_private_key), matching the PEM path and the docstring (L14)
- a non-PEM/non-SSH public key raises a clear ValueError instead of cryptography's
UnsupportedAlgorithm, consistent with the private-key paths (L15)
- decrypt_data only treats a json-OBJECT plaintext as a dict, so json-shaped strings
('123','true','[1,2]') round-trip as strings; existing dict blobs unaffected (L16)
- both key loads route through shared _load_private_key/_load_public_key helpers
- document reencrypt's fail-loud (vs decrypt_record's per-field swallow) asymmetry (nit).
Signed-off-by: disqualifier <dev@disqualifier.me>
get_rsa_key_fingerprint(is_private=True) only loaded PEM private keys, so an OpenSSH-format private key raised — unlike decrypt_aes_key_with_rsa, which already had the fallback. mirrored it: on a PEM load failure, an OPENSSH-marked key is loaded via load_ssh_private_key. also normalized the encrypted-key-without-password case: cryptography raises TypeError there, which now becomes a clear ValueError('private key is encrypted but no password was provided') in both methods instead of leaking the raw TypeError.
Signed-off-by: disqualifier <dev@disqualifier.me>
both used record.copy() (shallow), leaving unencrypted mutable fields shared between the input and the returned dict, violating the documented 'input is not mutated' contract. switched to copy.deepcopy.
Signed-off-by: disqualifier <dev@disqualifier.me>
get_rsa_key_fingerprint(is_private=True) called load_pem_private_key(password=None),
so an encrypted private key raised a raw TypeError. add an optional password param
forwarded to the load; unencrypted keys ignore it.
verified: encrypted private key fingerprints with its password and matches the
public key's fingerprint; missing password still raises.
Signed-off-by: disqualifier <dev@disqualifier.me>
