Fixes from the dpy4 audit report (REPORT_dpy4_audit.md, dpy_commons section): - dpycommons-1 (HIGH): safe_send/_send applied kwargs to the first chunk only, so allowed_mentions/silent/suppress_embeds dropped off every chunk after the first, letting a suppressed @everyone/@here fire live on later chunks of a mass-ping. Mention-control kwargs now apply to every chunk; file/ reference/view/etc. still ride the first message only. - dpycommons-4 (MED): _DISCORD_HOST_RE missed discordapp.net (Discord's own media/image CDN), causing wrap_bare_links to <>-wrap preview links Discord itself emits; dropped the nonexistent discord.media host. - dpycommons-8 (MED): discord_timestamp stamped naive datetimes as UTC, diverging from discord.py's own naive-datetime handling (local via astimezone()) and rendering the wrong wall time on non-UTC hosts. Now matches discord.py's behavior. - dpycommons-9: prompts.py hardcoded the 5-button/80-char/100-char limits inline instead of sourcing from limits.py; moved them to limits.py (BUTTON_ROW_MAX, BUTTON_LABEL_MAX, SELECT_OPTION_LABEL_MAX, SELECT_PLACEHOLDER_MAX, SELECT_MAX_OPTIONS) and corrected the placeholder cap from 100 to Discord's actual 150; choose() now raises ValueError above 25 options instead of failing inside discord.py's select builder. - dpycommons-3: choose()'s select-label path now truncates labels to SELECT_OPTION_LABEL_MAX so a >80-char key routed to the select can no longer build a >100-char option label. - dpycommons-7: safe_send's empty-input fallback now sends content=None instead of content='' (Discord rejects an explicit empty string). - redundant except: dropped discord.NotFound from parsing.py's attachment read except tuple (it subclasses HTTPException, already caught). - doc-only: softened chunk_text's "no content is lost" overclaim, documented extract_message_links as guild-only (DM @me links unmatched). Version 0.1.0 -> 0.1.1. Signed-off-by: disqualifier <dev@disqualifier.me>
dpy_commons
Shared discord.py utilities — the discord-side sibling of commons. A module of functions
grouped by concern: message/embed parsing, embed sanitizing + limit-fitting, link extraction,
text chunking, timestamp helpers, interactive await-prompts, and a limit-safe send.
Install
dpy_commons @ git+ssh://git@git.rethinkstudios.io/rethink-public/dpy_commons.git@v0.1.0
Usage
import dpy_commons as dc
# structured parse of a rich message (async — it reads attachments from the CDN)
payload = await dc.parse_message(message)
payload["mentions"]["users"] # [123, ...]
payload["poll"] # {"question": ..., "options": [...]} or None
# sanitize an embed to be safe-to-send (links wrapped, color normalized, within limits)
safe = dc.sanitize_embed(raw_embed)
# send that never trips a Discord limit: chunks content, fits + splits embeds
await dc.safe_send(channel, content=long_text, embeds=many_embeds)
# split a 5000-char blob into <=2000 pieces on clean boundaries
for piece in dc.chunk_text(blob):
await channel.send(piece)
# a live, timezone-local timestamp rendered by the Discord client; a naive dt is treated
# as local time (matching discord.py's own naive-datetime handling) — pass an aware dt
# if the source is UTC
dc.discord_timestamp(dt, "R") # "<t:1751500000:R>"
Interactive await-prompts
Throw a prompt, await it, get the answer back right there — no listener, no view subclass,
no state plumbing:
if await dc.confirm(ctx, "Delete 500 messages?"):
await purge()
action = await dc.choose(ctx, "Pick:", {
"✅": "approve",
"❌": "deny",
"<:escalate:123456789>": "escalate",
})
# action -> "approve" | "deny" | "escalate" | None (timeout)
confirm returns True/False/None; choose returns the mapped value (never the raw
interaction). Both scope to a user (a stranger's click gets an ephemeral "not for you" and the
prompt stays live), disable their components after resolve/timeout, accept custom emojis
anywhere an emoji goes, and take cleanup=True to delete the prompt afterward. choose
auto-switches to a select dropdown for more than 5 options or long labels, truncates select
option labels and the placeholder to Discord's caps, and raises ValueError for more than 25
options (Discord's per-select cap).
What's inside
| Concern | Functions |
|---|---|
| Parsing | parse_message (async), extract_message_links, sanitize_mentions |
| Embeds | fit_embed, sanitize_embed, split_embeds |
| Text | chunk_text, format_table, discord_timestamp, humanize_delta |
| Prompts | confirm, choose |
| Send | safe_send |
All Discord hard limits live as module constants (MSG_LIMIT, EMBED_TOTAL,
BUTTON_ROW_MAX, BUTTON_LABEL_MAX, SELECT_OPTION_LABEL_MAX, SELECT_PLACEHOLDER_MAX,
SELECT_MAX_OPTIONS, …) — the single source of truth; nothing hardcodes a limit.
Contract
Config-free (functions take the discord objects they act on, never a global). Fail-loud:
format_table raises ValueError on ragged rows, discord_timestamp on a bad style,
choose on empty options or more than 25 options; safe_send and the prompts propagate
Discord perms/HTTP errors (a prompt timeout is a normal None, not an error). The one
tolerated swallow is a single bad attachment in parse_message (warn + skip) — pass
strict=True to raise instead.
safe_send's mention-control kwargs (allowed_mentions, silent, suppress_embeds, tts)
apply to every chunked message, not just the first, so a suppressed @everyone/@here
stays suppressed across the whole split. Once-only kwargs (file, files, stickers,
nonce, reference, mention_author, view, poll, delete_after) still ride the first
message only. A bare safe_send(destination) with no content/embeds sends a single message
with content=None.
Notes / deviations
parse_messageisasync. The spec wrote it sync, but attachments are read from the CDN (network I/O), which cannot be synchronous. Await it.- Targets
discord.py>=2.2(notdiscord.py-self).
Versioning
Tagged vX.Y.Z; pin a tag in your install line.