add package: pyproject + src

EnvelopeCrypto: hybrid envelope encryption for dict records — a random
AES-256-GCM data key (DEK) encrypts the data, wrapped per-system via
RSA-OAEP (SHA-256) for distribution. config-free (DEK + key paths
injected), storage-agnostic, object-only. covers bootstrap/self_test,
authorize/deauthorize, rotate + reencrypt, and record-level decrypt.
src/ layout, hatchling build, cryptography backend.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: disqualifier <dev@disqualifier.me>

.gitignore

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # claude
-.claude/
+CLAUDE.md
 
 # python
 __pycache__/

README.md

@@ -11,19 +11,17 @@ and storage-agnostic.
 `requirements.txt`:
 
 ```
-envelope_crypto @ git+ssh://git@git.rethinkstudios.io/rethink-public/envelope_crypto.git@v0.1.6
+envelope_crypto @ git+ssh://git@git.rethinkstudios.io/rethink-public/envelope_crypto.git@v0.1.0
 ```
 
 Direct:
 
 ```bash
-pip install "envelope_crypto @ git+ssh://git@git.rethinkstudios.io/rethink-public/envelope_crypto.git@v0.1.6"
+pip install "envelope_crypto @ git+ssh://git@git.rethinkstudios.io/rethink-public/envelope_crypto.git@v0.1.0"
 ```
 
 Requires `cryptography` (pulled transitively).
 
-Drop the `@v0.1.6` suffix from the line above to install the latest unpinned.
-
 ## First-time setup
 
 Run once, ever, to create the data key and authorize the first system. You need an
@@ -39,10 +37,10 @@ openssl rsa -in local_priv.pem -pubout -out local_pub.pem
 from envelope_crypto import EnvelopeCrypto
 
 # generate the DEK and wrap it for this system in one call
-crypto, fingerprint, wrapped = EnvelopeCrypto.bootstrap("public_key.pem")
+crypto, fingerprint, wrapped = EnvelopeCrypto.bootstrap(cfg.local_pub)
 
 # verify the keypair actually round-trips BEFORE storing anything
-crypto.self_test("public_key.pem", "private_key.pem")        # raises if keys don't pair
+crypto.self_test(cfg.local_pub, cfg.local_priv)        # raises if keys don't pair
 
 # store the wrapped key — this is now the ONLY record of the DEK
 await db.create_document("keys", {"_id": fingerprint, "key": wrapped})
@@ -55,24 +53,17 @@ re-derived each boot by unwrapping. **Never persist the plaintext key.**
 
 ```python
 crypto = EnvelopeCrypto()
-fingerprint = crypto.get_rsa_key_fingerprint("public_key.pem")
+fingerprint = crypto.get_rsa_key_fingerprint(cfg.local_pub)
 record = await db.get_document("keys", {"_id": fingerprint})
 if not record:
     raise RuntimeError("this system is not authorized")
-crypto.initialize(crypto.decrypt_aes_key_with_rsa(record["key"], "private_key.pem"))
+crypto.initialize(crypto.decrypt_aes_key_with_rsa(record["key"], cfg.local_priv))
 bot.crypto = crypto
 ```
 
 The `keys` schema (`_id` = fingerprint, `key` = wrapped) is the **caller's** choice;
 this lib only produces `(fingerprint, wrapped_key)`.
 
-`decrypt_aes_key_with_rsa` (like `encrypt_aes_key_with_rsa` and
-`get_rsa_key_fingerprint`) takes `is_file` (default `True`). Pass `is_file=False` to
-hand it PEM/OpenSSH key data directly — e.g. a private key sourced from a vault —
-instead of a file path. `self_test` threads the same `is_file` through to both the
-public and private key it loads, so `self_test(pub_pem, priv_pem, is_file=False)`
-round-trips two in-memory PEM strings rather than treating them as paths.
-
 ## Encrypt / decrypt
 
 ```python
@@ -80,16 +71,9 @@ enc = crypto.encrypt_data({"ssn": "..."})      # -> {"secure": True, "iv": ...,
 plain = crypto.decrypt_data(enc)               # -> {"ssn": "..."}
 ```
 
-Dict keys must be `str`. `encrypt_data` raises `TypeError` on a non-str key (e.g. an
-int-keyed dict of Discord snowflakes) instead of silently stringifying it — the
-underlying JSON encoding has no other key type, so a coerced key would come back out
-of `decrypt_data` as a `str` and no longer match the original lookup key.
-
 For whole records: `decrypt_record(crypto, doc)` decrypts every `{secure, iv, data}`
 field (nested up to `traversal_level`, default 2); `is_encrypted_record(doc)` reports
-whether any encrypted field exists. Both also detect `doc` itself being a bare
-`{secure, iv, data}` blob (the file-storage pattern below, where the blob IS the whole
-document) — not just blobs nested under a key.
+whether any encrypted field exists.
 
 ```python
 from envelope_crypto import is_encrypted_record, decrypt_record
@@ -98,11 +82,6 @@ if is_encrypted_record(doc):
     doc = decrypt_record(crypto, doc)
 ```
 
-`is_encrypted_record` falls back to an unbounded-depth scan once `traversal_level` is
-exhausted, so it reliably reports `True` for a blob left behind by a shallower
-`decrypt_record`/`reencrypt` call — safe to use as a leftover-detecting audit after
-rotation, regardless of how deep the blob is nested.
-
 Naming aliases (same objects): `EnvelopeCrypto` = `DocumentCrypto` = `RecordCrypto`
 = `PCICrypto` (deprecated legacy alias). `decrypt_record` = `decrypt_document` =
 `decrypt_dict`; `is_encrypted_record` = `is_encrypted_document` = `is_encrypted_dict`.
@@ -148,14 +127,7 @@ for fingerprint, wrapped_key in wrapped.items():
 
 `reencrypt(source_crypto, record)` is a method on the **destination** (new-key)
 instance: it decrypts each encrypted field with `source_crypto` (old key) and
-re-encrypts with itself. Only `{secure, ...}` fields are touched — including `record`
-itself if it IS a `{secure, iv, data}` blob (the file-storage pattern).
-
-Rotation must fail loud: a per-field decrypt failure raises, and so does a blob nested
-deeper than `traversal_level` — silently leaving it under the old key would strand it
-once the old key's wrapped-key record is deleted below. If you nest blobs deeper than
-the default `traversal_level=2`, pass a higher `traversal_level` or flatten the record
-first.
+re-encrypts with itself. Only `{secure, ...}` fields are touched.
 
 ## Storage patterns
 
@@ -177,19 +149,7 @@ The lib never touches a database; only the caller's storage layer differs.
 - The scheme is envelope/hybrid encryption (AES-256-GCM data key wrapped by RSA-OAEP).
   Using it does not by itself confer PCI-DSS or any other compliance — that is a
   whole-system property.
-- `initialize(master_key)` requires exactly 32 bytes (`bytes`, `len == 32`) — a
-  16/24-byte key or a `str` raises `ValueError` instead of silently downgrading to
-  AES-128/192 or failing late at first encrypt.
-- Wrap/unwrap (`encrypt_aes_key_with_rsa`, `decrypt_aes_key_with_rsa`,
-  `authorize_system`, `bootstrap`, `rotate_master_key`) is **RSA-only**. A non-RSA
-  key (e.g. Ed25519/EC) loads and fingerprints fine but raises a clear `ValueError`
-  at wrap/unwrap rather than a raw `AttributeError`.
-- `fingerprint_data` serializes non-JSON-native values (datetime/date/time,
-  bytes/bytearray, ObjectId-like objects) via a stable `default=` handler instead of
-  raising `TypeError`, and type-tags dict keys internally so `{1: "a"}` and
-  `{"1": "a"}` no longer collide to the same fingerprint. Never logs the data it
-  fingerprints.
 
 ## Versioning
 
-Releases are tagged `vX.Y.Z`. The install line above pins a release; drop the `@vX.Y.Z` suffix to install the latest unpinned. Pin deliberately for reproducible installs.
+Tagged `vX.Y.Z`. Pin the tag in `requirements.txt`.

pyproject.toml

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ build-backend = "hatchling.build"
 
 [project]
 name = "envelope_crypto"
-version = "0.1.6"
+version = "0.1.0"
 description = "Envelope encryption (RSA-OAEP wrapped AES-256-GCM) for dict records — config-free, storage-agnostic, installable."
 requires-python = ">=3.10"
 dependencies = [

src/envelope_crypto/envelope_crypto.py

@@ -1,41 +1,40 @@
 """
 envelope encryption for dict records
 
-hybrid encryption: a random AES-256-GCM data key (DEK) encrypts the data, wrapped
-(RSA-OAEP) per authorized system's public key (KEK) for distribution. the wrapped
-key is stored by the caller, keyed by fingerprint; each system unwraps its own copy
-with its private key. same pattern KMS-style systems use. RSA-envelope only — a
-non-RSA key (e.g. Ed25519/EC) loads and fingerprints fine but raises ValueError at
-wrap/unwrap. never logs key material (DEK, PEM, wrapped key) — only fingerprints
-and counts.
+hybrid encryption: a random AES-256-GCM data key (DEK) encrypts the data, and
+that key is wrapped (RSA-OAEP) per authorized system's public key (KEK) for
+distribution. the wrapped key is stored by the caller, keyed by fingerprint;
+each system unwraps its own copy with its private key. this is the same
+envelope-encryption pattern used by KMS-style systems.
 
     from envelope_crypto import EnvelopeCrypto
 
     crypto = EnvelopeCrypto()
-    crypto.initialize(master_key)                      # exactly 32 bytes (AES-256)
+    crypto.initialize(master_key)                      # 32-byte AES DEK
     enc = crypto.encrypt_data({"ssn": "..."})          # -> {secure, iv, data}
     plain = crypto.decrypt_data(enc)                   # -> original
 
 first-time setup: generate the DEK and wrap it for the first system in one call,
 then verify the pipeline before storing anything:
 
-    crypto, fingerprint, wrapped = EnvelopeCrypto.bootstrap("public_key.pem")
-    crypto.self_test("public_key.pem", "private_key.pem")    # raises if anything is wrong
+    crypto, fingerprint, wrapped = EnvelopeCrypto.bootstrap(cfg.local_pub)
+    crypto.self_test(cfg.local_pub, cfg.local_priv)    # raises if anything is wrong
     caller_store({"_id": fingerprint, "key": wrapped}) # the only record of the DEK
 
 boot (already set up): fingerprint own pubkey, fetch the wrapped DEK, unwrap:
 
-    fp = crypto.get_rsa_key_fingerprint("public_key.pem")
+    fp = crypto.get_rsa_key_fingerprint(cfg.local_pub)
     record = caller_lookup(fp)
-    crypto.initialize(crypto.decrypt_aes_key_with_rsa(record["key"], "private_key.pem"))
+    crypto.initialize(crypto.decrypt_aes_key_with_rsa(record["key"], cfg.local_priv))
 
 authorize another system (this instance must already hold the DEK):
 
     fp, wrapped = crypto.authorize_system(other_pub_path)
     caller_store({"_id": fp, "key": wrapped})
 
-deauthorize: caller deletes that fingerprint's record. stops future unwraps but
-does not revoke a DEK already in a running system's memory — rotate if compromised.
+deauthorize: caller deletes that fingerprint's record. note this stops future
+unwraps but does not revoke a DEK already in a running system's memory — rotate
+if compromised.
 
 rotate (new DEK + re-encrypt): generate a new DEK, wrap for the still-authorized
 set, then re-encrypt existing records old -> new:
@@ -45,141 +44,30 @@ set, then re-encrypt existing records old -> new:
     for record in caller_iter():
         caller_update(new_crypto.reencrypt(crypto, record))
 
-reencrypt/is_encrypted_record/decrypt_record all detect a bare {secure, iv, data}
-blob used AS the whole record (file-storage pattern), not just blobs nested under a
-key. reencrypt fails loud (raises) rather than silently leaving a field under the
-old key — including a blob nested deeper than `traversal_level`; is_encrypted_record
-falls back to an unbounded-depth scan past traversal_level to reliably catch
-leftovers as a post-rotation audit.
-
 config-free: the host supplies the DEK and RSA key paths; this lib never imports
 config, configures logging, or touches a database. storage-agnostic — the
 encrypted blob is a plain dict; store it in mongo, a sql json column, or a file.
 
-encrypt_data/decrypt_data round-trip a dict only when every key is a str — json
-(the wire format) has no other key type, so encrypt_data raises TypeError on a
-non-str key (e.g. an int-keyed dict of discord snowflakes) rather than silently
-stringifying it and losing the original key on decrypt.
-
 naming: EnvelopeCrypto is canonical. PCICrypto / DocumentCrypto / RecordCrypto are
-aliases (PCICrypto is a deprecated legacy alias). the document/record/dict function
-variants are the same functions — use whichever fits your storage.
+aliases (PCICrypto is a deprecated legacy alias). the document/record/dict
+function variants are the same functions — use whichever fits your storage.
 """
 
 import os
-import copy
 import json
 import base64
 import hashlib
 import logging
 from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional, Tuple, Union
 
-from cryptography.exceptions import UnsupportedAlgorithm
 from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes, serialization
-from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import padding, rsa
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import padding
 from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers.aead import AESGCM
 from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.serialization import load_ssh_public_key
 
 _log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
 
-def _password_mismatch_message(pw: Optional[bytes]) -> str:
-    """clear ValueError text for a TypeError raised by a password/encryption mismatch
-
-    cryptography raises TypeError for both directions: encrypted key + no password,
-    and unencrypted key + a password given. branch on which the caller supplied so
-    the message matches the actual case instead of always claiming "encrypted".
-    """
-    if pw is not None:
-        return "password was given but private key is not encrypted"
-    return "private key is encrypted but no password was provided"
-
-
-def _load_private_key(key_data: bytes, pw: Optional[bytes]):
-    """load a PEM or OpenSSH private key, normalizing the password/encryption mismatch error
-
-    cryptography raises TypeError for a password/encryption mismatch (PEM raises it on
-    the first call; OpenSSH raises it inside the openssh fallback), normalized here to a
-    clear ValueError so callers see one error type with a message matching the actual case.
-    """
-    try:
-        return serialization.load_pem_private_key(key_data, password=pw)
-    except ValueError as error:
-        if b"BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY" in key_data:
-            try:
-                return serialization.load_ssh_private_key(key_data, password=pw)
-            except TypeError as ssh_error:
-                raise ValueError(_password_mismatch_message(pw)) from ssh_error
-        if pw is not None:
-            # a password was given but the PEM load still failed — most likely a wrong
-            # password; give a clearer message than cryptography's raw "Bad decrypt"
-            raise ValueError("could not load private key (wrong password or malformed key)") from error
-        raise error
-    except TypeError as error:
-        raise ValueError(_password_mismatch_message(pw)) from error
-
-
-def _fingerprint_of(public_key) -> str:
-    """base64 SHA-256 fingerprint of an already-loaded public key
-
-    factored so callers that already hold a loaded key (e.g. encrypt_aes_key_with_rsa)
-    don't re-open and re-parse the key file just to fingerprint it.
-    """
-    key_bytes = public_key.public_bytes(
-        encoding=serialization.Encoding.DER,
-        format=serialization.PublicFormat.SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
-    )
-    digest = hashes.Hash(hashes.SHA256())
-    digest.update(key_bytes)
-    return base64.b64encode(digest.finalize()).decode()
-
-
-def _is_blob(value: Any) -> bool:
-    """return whether value has the {secure, iv, data} encrypted-blob shape"""
-    return isinstance(value, dict) and value.get("secure") is True and "iv" in value and "data" in value
-
-
-def _has_encrypted_field(record: Any) -> bool:
-    """unbounded-depth scan: does record (or anything nested under it) contain a blob
-
-    used to detect a blob left behind by a depth-limited traversal — no traversal_level
-    cutoff here, since the whole point is to catch what a bounded pass would miss.
-    """
-    if not isinstance(record, dict):
-        return False
-    if _is_blob(record):
-        return True
-    return any(_has_encrypted_field(value) for value in record.values())
-
-
-def _require_rsa(key) -> None:
-    """raise ValueError unless key is an RSA public or private key
-
-    this lib is RSA-envelope only: get_rsa_key_fingerprint accepts any key type
-    (fingerprinting is algorithm-agnostic), but wrap/unwrap calls RSA-OAEP methods
-    that don't exist on e.g. Ed25519/EC keys and would otherwise crash raw with an
-    AttributeError far from a clear cause.
-    """
-    if not isinstance(key, (rsa.RSAPublicKey, rsa.RSAPrivateKey)):
-        raise ValueError(f"RSA key required for envelope wrap/unwrap, got {type(key).__name__}")
-
-
-def _load_public_key(key_data: bytes):
-    """load a PEM or OpenSSH public key, normalizing non-key input to ValueError
-
-    load_ssh_public_key raises UnsupportedAlgorithm (not ValueError) on non-SSH/garbage
-    input; normalize it so a bad public key always surfaces as a clear ValueError,
-    consistent with the private-key path.
-    """
-    try:
-        return serialization.load_pem_public_key(key_data)
-    except ValueError:
-        try:
-            return load_ssh_public_key(key_data)
-        except (UnsupportedAlgorithm, ValueError) as error:
-            raise ValueError("not a valid PEM or OpenSSH public key") from error
-
-
 class EnvelopeCrypto:
     """hybrid RSA/AES-256-GCM envelope encryption for dict records
 
@@ -211,11 +99,10 @@ class EnvelopeCrypto:
     ) -> bool:
         """verify the full pipeline against a keypair; raises on any mismatch
 
-        round-trips sample data through this instance's DEK, then wraps and unwraps
-        the DEK with the given keypair, confirming they match. run after bootstrap
-        (or as a health check) to catch a bad keypair or wrong path before relying
-        on it. is_file threads through to both key loads (is_file=False treats both
-        as in-memory PEM/OpenSSH data, not paths). returns True on success.
+        round-trips sample data through this instance's DEK, then wraps the DEK
+        with the public key and unwraps with the private key, confirming they
+        match. run after bootstrap (or anytime as a health check) to catch a bad
+        keypair or wrong key path before relying on it. returns True on success.
         """
         if not self.master_key:
             raise ValueError("self_test: not initialized with a key")
@@ -226,7 +113,7 @@ class EnvelopeCrypto:
 
         _, wrapped = self.encrypt_aes_key_with_rsa(self.master_key, rsa_public_key, is_file=is_file)
         try:
-            recovered = self.decrypt_aes_key_with_rsa(wrapped, rsa_private_key, is_file=is_file, password=password)
+            recovered = self.decrypt_aes_key_with_rsa(wrapped, rsa_private_key, password=password)
         except Exception as error:
             raise RuntimeError(
                 "self_test: key unwrap failed (public/private keys do not pair, "
@@ -239,15 +126,7 @@ class EnvelopeCrypto:
         return True
 
     def initialize(self, master_key: bytes) -> None:
-        """arm the instance with the AES data key (DEK)
-
-        requires exactly 32 bytes (AES-256): a shorter key would silently downgrade
-        to AES-128/192 with no warning, and a non-bytes value would otherwise fail
-        late and opaquely at first encrypt/decrypt — both rejected here instead.
-        never logs the key material itself.
-        """
-        if not isinstance(master_key, bytes) or len(master_key) != 32:
-            raise ValueError("master_key must be exactly 32 bytes (AES-256)")
+        """arm the instance with the AES data key (DEK)"""
         self.master_key = master_key
         _log.info("crypto initialized with data key")
 
@@ -268,17 +147,9 @@ class EnvelopeCrypto:
         return key
 
     def get_rsa_key_fingerprint(
-        self, key_path_or_data: str, is_private: bool = False, is_file: bool = True,
-        password: Optional[str] = None,
+        self, key_path_or_data: str, is_private: bool = False, is_file: bool = True
     ) -> str:
-        """return a base64 SHA-256 fingerprint of an RSA key for identification
-
-        for an encrypted private key (is_private=True), pass its `password`; an
-        unencrypted key ignores it. always fingerprints the public half, so a
-        private key and its public key match. PEM and OpenSSH accepted (mirrors
-        decrypt_aes_key_with_rsa). a password/encryption mismatch raises a clear
-        ValueError (cryptography's raw TypeError normalized here).
-        """
+        """return a base64 SHA-256 fingerprint of an RSA key for identification"""
         if is_file:
             with open(key_path_or_data, "rb") as key_file:
                 key_data = key_file.read()
@@ -290,32 +161,38 @@ class EnvelopeCrypto:
             )
 
         if is_private:
-            pw = password.encode() if password else None
-            private_key = _load_private_key(key_data, pw)
+            private_key = serialization.load_pem_private_key(key_data, password=None)
             public_key = private_key.public_key()
         else:
-            public_key = _load_public_key(key_data)
+            try:
+                public_key = serialization.load_pem_public_key(key_data)
+            except ValueError:
+                public_key = load_ssh_public_key(key_data)
 
-        fingerprint = _fingerprint_of(public_key)
+        key_bytes = public_key.public_bytes(
+            encoding=serialization.Encoding.DER,
+            format=serialization.PublicFormat.SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
+        )
+        digest = hashes.Hash(hashes.SHA256())
+        digest.update(key_bytes)
+        fingerprint = base64.b64encode(digest.finalize()).decode()
         _log.info("generated %s key fingerprint", "private" if is_private else "public")
         return fingerprint
 
     def encrypt_aes_key_with_rsa(
         self, aes_key: bytes, rsa_key: str, is_file: bool = True
     ) -> Tuple[str, str]:
-        """wrap an AES key with an RSA public key; returns (fingerprint, wrapped_b64)
-
-        raises ValueError if rsa_key is not an RSA key (this lib is RSA-envelope only;
-        e.g. an Ed25519/EC key loads and fingerprints fine but cannot wrap).
-        """
+        """wrap an AES key with an RSA public key; returns (fingerprint, wrapped_b64)"""
         if is_file:
             with open(rsa_key, "rb") as key_file:
                 key_data = key_file.read()
         else:
             key_data = rsa_key.encode() if isinstance(rsa_key, str) else rsa_key
 
-        public_key = _load_public_key(key_data)
-        _require_rsa(public_key)
+        try:
+            public_key = serialization.load_pem_public_key(key_data)
+        except ValueError:
+            public_key = load_ssh_public_key(key_data)
 
         wrapped = public_key.encrypt(
             aes_key,
@@ -325,31 +202,29 @@ class EnvelopeCrypto:
                 label=None,
             ),
         )
-        # fingerprint from the already-loaded public_key — no second open/parse of the file
-        fingerprint = _fingerprint_of(public_key)
+        fingerprint = self.get_rsa_key_fingerprint(rsa_key, is_private=False, is_file=is_file)
         wrapped_b64 = base64.b64encode(wrapped).decode()
         _log.info("wrapped data key for fingerprint %s", fingerprint[:8])
         return fingerprint, wrapped_b64
 
     def decrypt_aes_key_with_rsa(
-        self, encrypted_key_base64: str, rsa_private_key: str,
-        is_file: bool = True, password: Optional[str] = None,
+        self, encrypted_key_base64: str, rsa_private_key_path: str,
+        password: Optional[str] = None,
     ) -> bytes:
-        """unwrap an AES key with an RSA private key
-
-        is_file defaults to True (rsa_private_key is a path), matching
-        encrypt_aes_key_with_rsa / get_rsa_key_fingerprint; pass is_file=False to
-        supply the PEM/OpenSSH key data directly (e.g. an in-memory or vault-sourced
-        key) instead of a file path.
-        """
-        if is_file:
-            with open(rsa_private_key, "rb") as key_file:
-                key_data = key_file.read()
-        else:
-            key_data = rsa_private_key.encode() if isinstance(rsa_private_key, str) else rsa_private_key
-        pw = password.encode() if password else None
-        private_key = _load_private_key(key_data, pw)
-        _require_rsa(private_key)
+        """unwrap an AES key with an RSA private key"""
+        with open(rsa_private_key_path, "rb") as key_file:
+            key_data = key_file.read()
+        try:
+            private_key = serialization.load_pem_private_key(
+                key_data, password=password.encode() if password else None
+            )
+        except ValueError as error:
+            if b"BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY" in key_data:
+                private_key = serialization.load_ssh_private_key(
+                    key_data, password=password.encode() if password else None
+                )
+            else:
+                raise error
 
         wrapped = base64.b64decode(encrypted_key_base64)
         aes_key = private_key.decrypt(
@@ -392,30 +267,9 @@ class EnvelopeCrypto:
         return new_key, wrapped
 
     def encrypt_data(self, data: Union[Dict[str, Any], str]) -> Dict[str, str]:
-        """encrypt a dict or string under the data key with a unique IV
-
-        dict keys must be str: json.dumps silently stringifies int/float/bool/None
-        keys (e.g. a snowflake-int-keyed dict), which would make decrypt_data return
-        a dict that no longer matches the original by key type or identity — a
-        non-str key is rejected here instead, so the failure is loud at encrypt
-        time rather than a silent lookup miss after decrypt.
-        """
+        """encrypt a dict or string under the data key with a unique IV"""
         if not self.master_key:
             raise ValueError("not initialized with data key")
-        if not isinstance(data, (dict, str)):
-            # a non-dict/non-str would .encode()-fail with an opaque AttributeError below;
-            # reject it clearly (decrypt_data only round-trips dict or str anyway)
-            raise TypeError(f"encrypt_data expects a dict or str, got {type(data).__name__}")
-        if isinstance(data, dict):
-            non_str_keys = [key for key in data if not isinstance(key, str)]
-            if non_str_keys:
-                # json.dumps would silently stringify these (int/float/bool/None keys),
-                # corrupting the round-trip (decrypt_data would return a dict keyed by
-                # the stringified value) — fail loud instead of coercing
-                raise TypeError(
-                    "encrypt_data requires str dict keys, got non-str key(s): "
-                    f"{[type(key).__name__ for key in non_str_keys]}"
-                )
 
         data_str = json.dumps(data) if isinstance(data, dict) else data
         iv = os.urandom(12)
@@ -428,73 +282,35 @@ class EnvelopeCrypto:
         }
 
     def decrypt_data(self, encrypted_data: Dict[str, str]) -> Union[Dict[str, Any], str]:
-        """decrypt a {secure, iv, data} blob; returns the original dict or string
-
-        encrypt_data only json-encodes dicts (a string is stored verbatim), so decrypt
-        treats a json-OBJECT plaintext as a dict and everything else as a raw string —
-        a json-shaped but non-object string ('123', 'true', '[1,2]') round-trips as a
-        STRING, not int/bool/list. one irreducible ambiguity: a string whose exact
-        value is a json object ('{"a":1}') decrypts to a dict, indistinguishable
-        without a type marker from a stored dict — don't store a bare json-object
-        string if you need it back as a string. dict keys round-trip faithfully
-        because encrypt_data requires str keys (json's only key type).
-        """
+        """decrypt a {secure, iv, data} blob; returns the original dict or string"""
         if not self.master_key:
             raise ValueError("not initialized with data key")
-        if not isinstance(encrypted_data, dict) or "iv" not in encrypted_data or "data" not in encrypted_data:
-            # a structurally-malformed blob would raise a raw KeyError/TypeError; surface
-            # a clear ValueError instead, matching the documented {secure, iv, data} shape
-            raise ValueError("decrypt_data expects a {secure, iv, data} blob")
 
         iv = base64.b64decode(encrypted_data["iv"])
         ciphertext = base64.b64decode(encrypted_data["data"])
         aesgcm = AESGCM(self.master_key)
         plaintext = aesgcm.decrypt(iv, ciphertext, None).decode()
         try:
-            parsed = json.loads(plaintext)
+            return json.loads(plaintext)
         except json.JSONDecodeError:
             return plaintext
-        return parsed if isinstance(parsed, dict) else plaintext
 
     def reencrypt(self, source_crypto: "EnvelopeCrypto", record: dict, traversal_level: int = 2) -> dict:
         """re-encrypt a record's encrypted fields from source_crypto's key to this one's
 
-        self holds the destination (new) key; source_crypto holds the source (old) key.
-        only {secure, iv, data} fields are touched; plaintext fields are left as-is.
-        returns a new dict; the input is not mutated. used during rotation. if `record`
-        itself is a bare blob (file-storage pattern) it is re-encrypted directly and
-        returned in place of `record`, not nested under a key.
-
-        fails loud, unlike decrypt_record: a per-field decrypt failure RAISES (silently
-        keeping a field under the old key would lose it once that key is retired), and
-        so does a blob nested DEEPER than `traversal_level` — raise a higher
-        traversal_level or flatten the record before rotation instead.
-
-        traversal recurses into nested DICTS only; a blob nested inside a LIST is not
-        re-encrypted and not covered by the depth-limit raise. this scheme keys blobs
-        by field name, not inside arrays, so this shouldn't arise in practice — but
-        flatten list-nested blobs to dict fields before rotation or they'll be
-        silently left under the old key.
+        self holds the destination (new) key; source_crypto holds the source (old)
+        key. only {secure, iv, data} fields are touched; plaintext fields are left
+        as-is. returns a new dict; the input is not mutated. used during rotation.
         """
         if not self.master_key:
             raise ValueError("destination not initialized with data key")
 
-        if _is_blob(record):
-            return self.encrypt_data(source_crypto.decrypt_data(record))
-
-        result = copy.deepcopy(record)
+        result = record.copy()
         for key, value in record.items():
-            if _is_blob(value):
+            if isinstance(value, dict) and value.get("secure") is True and "iv" in value and "data" in value:
                 result[key] = self.encrypt_data(source_crypto.decrypt_data(value))
-            elif isinstance(value, dict):
-                if traversal_level > 0:
-                    result[key] = self.reencrypt(source_crypto, value, traversal_level - 1)
-                elif _has_encrypted_field(value):
-                    raise ValueError(
-                        f"reencrypt: field {key!r} contains an encrypted blob nested deeper "
-                        "than traversal_level; increase traversal_level or flatten the record "
-                        "before rotation — leaving it would strand the field under the old key"
-                    )
+            elif traversal_level > 0 and isinstance(value, dict):
+                result[key] = self.reencrypt(source_crypto, value, traversal_level - 1)
         return result
 
 
@@ -507,41 +323,28 @@ PCICrypto = EnvelopeCrypto  # deprecated legacy alias; remove after all systems
 def is_encrypted_record(record, traversal_level: int = 2) -> bool:
     """return whether a record has any encrypted ({secure, iv, data}) fields
 
-    checks `record` itself (the file-storage pattern stores the blob AS the whole
-    document) as well as fields up to `traversal_level` deep. beyond that bounded
-    pass, falls back to an unbounded-depth scan, so a blob left behind by a
-    shallower decrypt_record/reencrypt call is still reported — safe to use as a
-    leftover-detecting post-rotation audit; never returns False for a record that
-    still contains a blob, at any depth.
-
     aliases: is_encrypted_document, is_encrypted_dict — same function
     """
     if not isinstance(record, dict):
         return False
 
-    if _is_blob(record):
-        return True
-
     for value in record.values():
-        if _is_blob(value):
-            return True
+        if isinstance(value, dict) and value.get("secure") is True:
+            if "iv" in value and "data" in value:
+                return True
 
     if traversal_level > 0:
         for value in record.values():
             if isinstance(value, dict) and is_encrypted_record(value, traversal_level - 1):
                 return True
-        return False
-
-    return any(_has_encrypted_field(value) for value in record.values())
+    return False
 
 
-def decrypt_record(crypto: EnvelopeCrypto, record, traversal_level: int = 2) -> Union[dict, Any]:
+def decrypt_record(crypto: EnvelopeCrypto, record, traversal_level: int = 2) -> dict:
     """decrypt a record's encrypted fields into a new dict (up to traversal_level deep)
 
-    if `record` itself is a bare {secure, iv, data} blob (file-storage pattern) it is
-    decrypted directly and the value (dict or string — see decrypt_data) is returned
-    in place of `record`. a failure on a single field (or on `record` itself) is
-    logged and left encrypted, so a partial failure stays visible rather than silent.
+    failures on a single field are logged and that field is left encrypted, so a
+    partial failure is visible (the {secure,...} blob remains) rather than silent.
 
     aliases: decrypt_document, decrypt_dict — same function
     """
@@ -550,16 +353,9 @@ def decrypt_record(crypto: EnvelopeCrypto, record, traversal_level: int = 2) ->
     if not isinstance(record, dict):
         return record
 
-    if _is_blob(record):
-        try:
-            return crypto.decrypt_data(record)
-        except Exception:
-            _log.exception("failed to decrypt record")
-            return copy.deepcopy(record)
-
-    result = copy.deepcopy(record)
+    result = record.copy()
     for key, value in record.items():
-        if _is_blob(value):
+        if isinstance(value, dict) and value.get("secure") is True and "iv" in value and "data" in value:
             try:
                 result[key] = crypto.decrypt_data(value)
             except Exception:
@@ -569,49 +365,9 @@ def decrypt_record(crypto: EnvelopeCrypto, record, traversal_level: int = 2) ->
     return result
 
 
-def _fingerprint_default(value: Any) -> str:
-    """json.dumps default= handler for values fingerprint_data can't natively serialize
-
-    covers datetime/date/time (isoformat), bytes/bytearray (hex), and anything else
-    (e.g. ObjectId) via a type-tagged repr — never raises, never logs the value.
-    """
-    if hasattr(value, "isoformat"):
-        return f"isoformat:{value.isoformat()}"
-    if isinstance(value, (bytes, bytearray)):
-        return f"hex:{value.hex()}"
-    return f"{type(value).__name__}:{value!r}"
-
-
-def _fingerprint_normalize(value: Any) -> Any:
-    """recursively tag dict keys with their type to avoid cross-type key collisions
-
-    json object keys are always strings, so {1: "a"} and {"1": "a"} would otherwise
-    serialize identically and collide to the same fingerprint; prefixing each key with
-    its type name keeps them distinct. non-dict containers/values pass through
-    untouched (lists recurse; leaf values are handled by _fingerprint_default).
-    """
-    if isinstance(value, dict):
-        return {
-            f"{type(key).__name__}:{key!r}": _fingerprint_normalize(sub_value)
-            for key, sub_value in value.items()
-        }
-    if isinstance(value, (list, tuple)):
-        return [_fingerprint_normalize(item) for item in value]
-    return value
-
-
 def fingerprint_data(data: dict) -> str:
-    """return a deterministic, collision-free SHA-256 hex fingerprint of a dict
-
-    dict keys of different types that would otherwise coerce to the same JSON string
-    (e.g. {1: "a"} vs {"1": "a"}) are kept distinct via a type-tagged pre-pass. values
-    that aren't JSON-native (datetime/date/time, bytes/bytearray, ObjectId-like
-    objects) are serialized via a stable default= handler instead of raising. never
-    logs the data being fingerprinted.
-    """
-    normalized = _fingerprint_normalize(data)
-    encoded = json.dumps(normalized, sort_keys=True, default=_fingerprint_default)
-    return hashlib.sha256(encoded.encode()).hexdigest()
+    """return a deterministic SHA-256 hex fingerprint of a dict"""
+    return hashlib.sha256(json.dumps(data, sort_keys=True).encode()).hexdigest()
 
 
 # function aliases — same functions, naming preference only