fix: is_file drift on decrypt_aes_key_with_rsa and non-str dict key coercion

self_test(is_file=False) only forwarded is_file to the public-key wrap;
decrypt_aes_key_with_rsa had no is_file parameter and always open()'d its
argument, so a PEM string was opened as a filename, misdiagnosing a good
keypair as non-pairing and leaking the private key PEM into the
FileNotFoundError traceback. decrypt_aes_key_with_rsa now takes is_file
(default True, preserving current callers), and self_test threads it
through to both key loads.

encrypt_data json.dumps a dict without checking key types, silently
stringifying int/float/bool/None keys (e.g. snowflake-int-keyed dicts),
so a decrypt round-trip silently lost the original key. encrypt_data now
raises TypeError on a non-str key instead of coercing it.

Signed-off-by: disqualifier <dev@disqualifier.me>

README.md

@@ -11,18 +11,18 @@ and storage-agnostic.
 `requirements.txt`:
 
 ```
-envelope_crypto @ git+ssh://git@git.rethinkstudios.io/rethink-public/envelope_crypto.git@v0.1.3
+envelope_crypto @ git+ssh://git@git.rethinkstudios.io/rethink-public/envelope_crypto.git@v0.1.5
 ```
 
 Direct:
 
 ```bash
-pip install "envelope_crypto @ git+ssh://git@git.rethinkstudios.io/rethink-public/envelope_crypto.git@v0.1.3"
+pip install "envelope_crypto @ git+ssh://git@git.rethinkstudios.io/rethink-public/envelope_crypto.git@v0.1.5"
 ```
 
 Requires `cryptography` (pulled transitively).
 
-Drop the `@v0.1.3` suffix from the line above to install the latest unpinned.
+Drop the `@v0.1.5` suffix from the line above to install the latest unpinned.
 
 ## First-time setup
 
@@ -66,6 +66,13 @@ bot.crypto = crypto
 The `keys` schema (`_id` = fingerprint, `key` = wrapped) is the **caller's** choice;
 this lib only produces `(fingerprint, wrapped_key)`.
 
+`decrypt_aes_key_with_rsa` (like `encrypt_aes_key_with_rsa` and
+`get_rsa_key_fingerprint`) takes `is_file` (default `True`). Pass `is_file=False` to
+hand it PEM/OpenSSH key data directly — e.g. a private key sourced from a vault —
+instead of a file path. `self_test` threads the same `is_file` through to both the
+public and private key it loads, so `self_test(pub_pem, priv_pem, is_file=False)`
+round-trips two in-memory PEM strings rather than treating them as paths.
+
 ## Encrypt / decrypt
 
 ```python
@@ -73,9 +80,16 @@ enc = crypto.encrypt_data({"ssn": "..."})      # -> {"secure": True, "iv": ...,
 plain = crypto.decrypt_data(enc)               # -> {"ssn": "..."}
 ```
 
+Dict keys must be `str`. `encrypt_data` raises `TypeError` on a non-str key (e.g. an
+int-keyed dict of Discord snowflakes) instead of silently stringifying it — the
+underlying JSON encoding has no other key type, so a coerced key would come back out
+of `decrypt_data` as a `str` and no longer match the original lookup key.
+
 For whole records: `decrypt_record(crypto, doc)` decrypts every `{secure, iv, data}`
 field (nested up to `traversal_level`, default 2); `is_encrypted_record(doc)` reports
-whether any encrypted field exists.
+whether any encrypted field exists. Both also detect `doc` itself being a bare
+`{secure, iv, data}` blob (the file-storage pattern below, where the blob IS the whole
+document) — not just blobs nested under a key.
 
 ```python
 from envelope_crypto import is_encrypted_record, decrypt_record
@@ -84,6 +98,11 @@ if is_encrypted_record(doc):
     doc = decrypt_record(crypto, doc)
 ```
 
+`is_encrypted_record` falls back to an unbounded-depth scan once `traversal_level` is
+exhausted, so it reliably reports `True` for a blob left behind by a shallower
+`decrypt_record`/`reencrypt` call — safe to use as a leftover-detecting audit after
+rotation, regardless of how deep the blob is nested.
+
 Naming aliases (same objects): `EnvelopeCrypto` = `DocumentCrypto` = `RecordCrypto`
 = `PCICrypto` (deprecated legacy alias). `decrypt_record` = `decrypt_document` =
 `decrypt_dict`; `is_encrypted_record` = `is_encrypted_document` = `is_encrypted_dict`.
@@ -129,7 +148,14 @@ for fingerprint, wrapped_key in wrapped.items():
 
 `reencrypt(source_crypto, record)` is a method on the **destination** (new-key)
 instance: it decrypts each encrypted field with `source_crypto` (old key) and
-re-encrypts with itself. Only `{secure, ...}` fields are touched.
+re-encrypts with itself. Only `{secure, ...}` fields are touched — including `record`
+itself if it IS a `{secure, iv, data}` blob (the file-storage pattern).
+
+Rotation must fail loud: a per-field decrypt failure raises, and so does a blob nested
+deeper than `traversal_level` — silently leaving it under the old key would strand it
+once the old key's wrapped-key record is deleted below. If you nest blobs deeper than
+the default `traversal_level=2`, pass a higher `traversal_level` or flatten the record
+first.
 
 ## Storage patterns
 

pyproject.toml

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ build-backend = "hatchling.build"
 
 [project]
 name = "envelope_crypto"
-version = "0.1.3"
+version = "0.1.5"
 description = "Envelope encryption (RSA-OAEP wrapped AES-256-GCM) for dict records — config-free, storage-agnostic, installable."
 requires-python = ">=3.10"
 dependencies = [

src/envelope_crypto/envelope_crypto.py

@@ -44,10 +44,22 @@ set, then re-encrypt existing records old -> new:
     for record in caller_iter():
         caller_update(new_crypto.reencrypt(crypto, record))
 
+reencrypt/is_encrypted_record/decrypt_record all detect a bare {secure, iv, data}
+blob used AS the whole record (the file-storage pattern), not just blobs nested
+under a key. reencrypt fails loud (raises) rather than silently leaving a field
+under the old key — including when a blob sits deeper than `traversal_level`;
+is_encrypted_record falls back to an unbounded-depth scan past traversal_level so
+it reliably catches leftovers as a post-rotation audit.
+
 config-free: the host supplies the DEK and RSA key paths; this lib never imports
 config, configures logging, or touches a database. storage-agnostic — the
 encrypted blob is a plain dict; store it in mongo, a sql json column, or a file.
 
+encrypt_data/decrypt_data round-trip a dict only when every key is a str —
+json (the wire format under the hood) has no other key type, so encrypt_data
+raises TypeError on a non-str key (e.g. an int-keyed dict of discord snowflakes)
+rather than silently stringifying it and losing the original key on decrypt.
+
 naming: EnvelopeCrypto is canonical. PCICrypto / DocumentCrypto / RecordCrypto are
 aliases (PCICrypto is a deprecated legacy alias). the document/record/dict
 function variants are the same functions — use whichever fits your storage.
@@ -113,6 +125,24 @@ def _fingerprint_of(public_key) -> str:
     return base64.b64encode(digest.finalize()).decode()
 
 
+def _is_blob(value: Any) -> bool:
+    """return whether value has the {secure, iv, data} encrypted-blob shape"""
+    return isinstance(value, dict) and value.get("secure") is True and "iv" in value and "data" in value
+
+
+def _has_encrypted_field(record: Any) -> bool:
+    """unbounded-depth scan: does record (or anything nested under it) contain a blob
+
+    used to detect a blob left behind by a depth-limited traversal — no traversal_level
+    cutoff here, since the whole point is to catch what a bounded pass would miss.
+    """
+    if not isinstance(record, dict):
+        return False
+    if _is_blob(record):
+        return True
+    return any(_has_encrypted_field(value) for value in record.values())
+
+
 def _load_public_key(key_data: bytes):
     """load a PEM or OpenSSH public key, normalizing non-key input to ValueError
 
@@ -163,7 +193,11 @@ class EnvelopeCrypto:
         round-trips sample data through this instance's DEK, then wraps the DEK
         with the public key and unwraps with the private key, confirming they
         match. run after bootstrap (or anytime as a health check) to catch a bad
-        keypair or wrong key path before relying on it. returns True on success.
+        keypair or wrong key path before relying on it. is_file (default True) is
+        threaded through to both the public and private key loads, so
+        is_file=False correctly treats both rsa_public_key and rsa_private_key as
+        in-memory PEM/OpenSSH data rather than opening either as a file path.
+        returns True on success.
         """
         if not self.master_key:
             raise ValueError("self_test: not initialized with a key")
@@ -174,7 +208,7 @@ class EnvelopeCrypto:
 
         _, wrapped = self.encrypt_aes_key_with_rsa(self.master_key, rsa_public_key, is_file=is_file)
         try:
-            recovered = self.decrypt_aes_key_with_rsa(wrapped, rsa_private_key, password=password)
+            recovered = self.decrypt_aes_key_with_rsa(wrapped, rsa_private_key, is_file=is_file, password=password)
         except Exception as error:
             raise RuntimeError(
                 "self_test: key unwrap failed (public/private keys do not pair, "
@@ -268,12 +302,21 @@ class EnvelopeCrypto:
         return fingerprint, wrapped_b64
 
     def decrypt_aes_key_with_rsa(
-        self, encrypted_key_base64: str, rsa_private_key_path: str,
-        password: Optional[str] = None,
+        self, encrypted_key_base64: str, rsa_private_key: str,
+        is_file: bool = True, password: Optional[str] = None,
     ) -> bytes:
-        """unwrap an AES key with an RSA private key"""
-        with open(rsa_private_key_path, "rb") as key_file:
+        """unwrap an AES key with an RSA private key
+
+        is_file defaults to True (rsa_private_key is a path), matching
+        encrypt_aes_key_with_rsa / get_rsa_key_fingerprint; pass is_file=False to
+        supply the PEM/OpenSSH key data directly (e.g. an in-memory or vault-sourced
+        key) instead of a file path.
+        """
+        if is_file:
+            with open(rsa_private_key, "rb") as key_file:
                 key_data = key_file.read()
+        else:
+            key_data = rsa_private_key.encode() if isinstance(rsa_private_key, str) else rsa_private_key
         pw = password.encode() if password else None
         private_key = _load_private_key(key_data, pw)
 
@@ -318,13 +361,30 @@ class EnvelopeCrypto:
         return new_key, wrapped
 
     def encrypt_data(self, data: Union[Dict[str, Any], str]) -> Dict[str, str]:
-        """encrypt a dict or string under the data key with a unique IV"""
+        """encrypt a dict or string under the data key with a unique IV
+
+        dict keys must be str: json.dumps silently stringifies int/float/bool/None
+        keys (e.g. a snowflake-int-keyed dict), which would make decrypt_data return
+        a dict that no longer matches the original by key type or identity — a
+        non-str key is rejected here instead, so the failure is loud at encrypt
+        time rather than a silent lookup miss after decrypt.
+        """
         if not self.master_key:
             raise ValueError("not initialized with data key")
         if not isinstance(data, (dict, str)):
             # a non-dict/non-str would .encode()-fail with an opaque AttributeError below;
             # reject it clearly (decrypt_data only round-trips dict or str anyway)
             raise TypeError(f"encrypt_data expects a dict or str, got {type(data).__name__}")
+        if isinstance(data, dict):
+            non_str_keys = [key for key in data if not isinstance(key, str)]
+            if non_str_keys:
+                # json.dumps would silently stringify these (int/float/bool/None keys),
+                # corrupting the round-trip (decrypt_data would return a dict keyed by
+                # the stringified value) — fail loud instead of coercing
+                raise TypeError(
+                    "encrypt_data requires str dict keys, got non-str key(s): "
+                    f"{[type(key).__name__ for key in non_str_keys]}"
+                )
 
         data_str = json.dumps(data) if isinstance(data, dict) else data
         iv = os.urandom(12)
@@ -348,6 +408,8 @@ class EnvelopeCrypto:
         without a type marker it is indistinguishable from a stored dict — don't store a
         bare string that is a json object if you need it back as a string. existing stored
         blobs are unaffected — a dict was stored as a json object and still parses to a dict.
+        dict KEYS round-trip faithfully only because encrypt_data now requires str keys —
+        json has no other key type, so this is the only shape decrypt_data ever sees.
         """
         if not self.master_key:
             raise ValueError("not initialized with data key")
@@ -373,25 +435,42 @@ class EnvelopeCrypto:
         key. only {secure, iv, data} fields are touched; plaintext fields are left
         as-is. returns a new dict; the input is not mutated. used during rotation.
 
+        if `record` itself is a {secure, iv, data} blob (the file-storage pattern, where
+        the blob IS the whole document) it is re-encrypted directly and the result is
+        returned in place of `record` — not nested under a key.
+
         unlike decrypt_record (which logs a failed field and leaves it encrypted), a
         per-field decrypt failure here RAISES — rotation must fail loud, since silently
-        keeping a field under the old key would lose it once the old key is retired.
+        keeping a field under the old key would lose it once the old key is retired. for
+        the same reason, a blob nested DEEPER than `traversal_level` also RAISES instead
+        of being silently left under the old key: the caller either needs a higher
+        `traversal_level` or must flatten the record before rotation.
 
-        traversal recurses into nested DICTS only (up to `traversal_level`); a blob nested
-        inside a LIST is NOT re-encrypted. records in this scheme key blobs by field name,
-        not inside arrays, so this doesn't arise in practice — but if you store
-        list-nested blobs, flatten them to dict fields before rotation or they'll be left
-        under the old key.
+        traversal recurses into nested DICTS only; a blob nested inside a LIST is NOT
+        re-encrypted and is NOT covered by the depth-limit raise above. records in this
+        scheme key blobs by field name, not inside arrays, so this doesn't arise in
+        practice — but if you store list-nested blobs, flatten them to dict fields before
+        rotation or they'll be silently left under the old key.
         """
         if not self.master_key:
             raise ValueError("destination not initialized with data key")
 
+        if _is_blob(record):
+            return self.encrypt_data(source_crypto.decrypt_data(record))
+
         result = copy.deepcopy(record)
         for key, value in record.items():
-            if isinstance(value, dict) and value.get("secure") is True and "iv" in value and "data" in value:
+            if _is_blob(value):
                 result[key] = self.encrypt_data(source_crypto.decrypt_data(value))
-            elif traversal_level > 0 and isinstance(value, dict):
+            elif isinstance(value, dict):
+                if traversal_level > 0:
                     result[key] = self.reencrypt(source_crypto, value, traversal_level - 1)
+                elif _has_encrypted_field(value):
+                    raise ValueError(
+                        f"reencrypt: field {key!r} contains an encrypted blob nested deeper "
+                        "than traversal_level; increase traversal_level or flatten the record "
+                        "before rotation — leaving it would strand the field under the old key"
+                    )
         return result
 
 
@@ -404,14 +483,24 @@ PCICrypto = EnvelopeCrypto  # deprecated legacy alias; remove after all systems
 def is_encrypted_record(record, traversal_level: int = 2) -> bool:
     """return whether a record has any encrypted ({secure, iv, data}) fields
 
+    checks `record` itself (the file-storage pattern stores the blob AS the whole
+    document, not nested under a key) as well as fields up to `traversal_level` deep.
+    beyond that bounded pass, this ALSO does an unbounded-depth scan before giving up —
+    so a blob left behind by a shallower decrypt_record/reencrypt call (nested deeper
+    than their traversal_level) is still reported as encrypted. this makes the function
+    safe to use as a leftover-detecting post-rotation audit: it never returns False for
+    a record that still contains a blob, at any depth.
+
     aliases: is_encrypted_document, is_encrypted_dict — same function
     """
     if not isinstance(record, dict):
         return False
 
+    if _is_blob(record):
+        return True
+
     for value in record.values():
-        if isinstance(value, dict) and value.get("secure") is True:
-            if "iv" in value and "data" in value:
+        if _is_blob(value):
             return True
 
     if traversal_level > 0:
@@ -420,12 +509,20 @@ def is_encrypted_record(record, traversal_level: int = 2) -> bool:
                 return True
         return False
 
+    return any(_has_encrypted_field(value) for value in record.values())
 
-def decrypt_record(crypto: EnvelopeCrypto, record, traversal_level: int = 2) -> dict:
+
+def decrypt_record(crypto: EnvelopeCrypto, record, traversal_level: int = 2) -> Union[dict, Any]:
     """decrypt a record's encrypted fields into a new dict (up to traversal_level deep)
 
+    if `record` itself is a {secure, iv, data} blob (the file-storage pattern, where the
+    blob IS the whole document) it is decrypted directly and the decrypted value
+    (dict or string — see decrypt_data) is returned in place of `record`.
+
     failures on a single field are logged and that field is left encrypted, so a
-    partial failure is visible (the {secure,...} blob remains) rather than silent.
+    partial failure is visible (the {secure,...} blob remains) rather than silent. a
+    failure decrypting `record` itself (the self-blob case above) is likewise logged
+    and the still-encrypted blob is returned unchanged.
 
     aliases: decrypt_document, decrypt_dict — same function
     """
@@ -434,9 +531,16 @@ def decrypt_record(crypto: EnvelopeCrypto, record, traversal_level: int = 2) ->
     if not isinstance(record, dict):
         return record
 
+    if _is_blob(record):
+        try:
+            return crypto.decrypt_data(record)
+        except Exception:
+            _log.exception("failed to decrypt record")
+            return copy.deepcopy(record)
+
     result = copy.deepcopy(record)
     for key, value in record.items():
-        if isinstance(value, dict) and value.get("secure") is True and "iv" in value and "data" in value:
+        if _is_blob(value):
             try:
                 result[key] = crypto.decrypt_data(value)
             except Exception: