fix: pin inter-lib dependencies to their v1.0.0 tags

the v1.0.0 release still pinned pre-1.0.0 sibling tags, so a fresh install dragged in
stale transitive deps. update the pin(s) to the current v1.0.x release and bump this lib
to 1.0.1 so the corrected dependency chain ships under a new tag (v1.0.0 left intact).

Signed-off-by: disqualifier <dev@disqualifier.me>

README.md

@@ -13,26 +13,26 @@ authorization system and the key-document schema; the crypto primitives live in
 ## Install
 
 ```
-envelope_authorizer @ git+ssh://git@git.rethinkstudios.io/rethink-public/envelope_authorizer.git@v0.1.2
+envelope_authorizer @ git+ssh://git@git.rethinkstudios.io/rethink-public/envelope_authorizer.git@v1.0.1
 ```
 
 Direct:
 
 ```bash
-pip install "envelope_authorizer @ git+ssh://git@git.rethinkstudios.io/rethink-public/envelope_authorizer.git@v0.1.2"
+pip install "envelope_authorizer @ git+ssh://git@git.rethinkstudios.io/rethink-public/envelope_authorizer.git@v1.0.1"
 ```
 
 The base install uses a local JSON file for storage (stdlib only). For shared
 dev→server storage, install the mongo extra:
 
 ```bash
-pip install "envelope_authorizer[mongo] @ git+ssh://git@git.rethinkstudios.io/rethink-public/envelope_authorizer.git@v0.1.2"
+pip install "envelope_authorizer[mongo] @ git+ssh://git@git.rethinkstudios.io/rethink-public/envelope_authorizer.git@v1.0.1"
 ```
 
 Installing pulls `envelope_crypto` (and `mongo` with the extra). After install,
 the `authorizer` command is on your PATH; `python -m envelope_authorizer` also works.
 
-Drop the `@v0.1.2` suffix from the line above to install the latest unpinned.
+Drop the `@v1.0.1` suffix from the line above to install the latest unpinned.
 
 ## Trust model (read this)
 
@@ -129,7 +129,11 @@ initialized or the friendly name is taken.
 Boots the local DEK, verifies the local key is itself an authorizer, then wraps
 the same DEK to the target public key and stores a new key doc. Omit
 `--can-authorize` for servers (`allowed: False`); pass it only for trusted
-dev/home machines.
+dev/home machines. Refuses a target key whose fingerprint already has a record
+(most importantly the local key itself) — `save` upserts by `_id`, so
+authorizing an already-known key would silently replace its existing doc
+(capability flag and friendly name) under a success banner instead of adding a
+new key. Revoke the existing record first if you intend to re-authorize it.
 
 ```
 [✔] Authorized Jy7k2ey7... | friendly: server1 [can_authorize=False]
@@ -170,9 +174,10 @@ rotation.
 
 ## Config reference
 
-TOML, searched cwd-first then `~`: `.authorizer.toml`. Paths expand `~`. No
-defaults are baked in — a missing required field raises an error naming the field
-and the config path.
+TOML, searched cwd-first then `~`: `.authorizer.toml`. Paths (`keys.public`,
+`keys.private`, `storage.path`) expand both `~` and `$ENV_VARS`. No defaults are
+baked in — a missing required field raises an error naming the field and the
+config path.
 
 ### JSON backend (default, stdlib only)
 
@@ -181,6 +186,7 @@ and the config path.
 public   = "~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub"
 private  = "~/.ssh/id_rsa"
 identity = "user@hostname"          # stamped as created_by on every key doc
+# password = "..."                  # only if the private key above is encrypted
 
 [storage]
 backend = "json"

pyproject.toml

@@ -4,17 +4,18 @@ build-backend = "hatchling.build"
 
 [project]
 name = "envelope_authorizer"
-version = "0.1.2"
+version = "1.0.1"
 description = "CLI key-authorization manager for envelope_crypto"
 requires-python = ">=3.10"
 dependencies = [
-    "envelope_crypto @ git+ssh://git@git.rethinkstudios.io/rethink-public/envelope_crypto.git@v0.1.0",
+    "envelope_crypto @ git+ssh://git@git.rethinkstudios.io/rethink-public/envelope_crypto.git@v1.0.0",
+    "cryptography>=42.0",
     "tomli>=2.0; python_version<'3.11'",
 ]
 
 [project.optional-dependencies]
 mongo = [
-    "mongo @ git+ssh://git@git.rethinkstudios.io/rethink-public/mongo.git@v0.1.0",
+    "mongo @ git+ssh://git@git.rethinkstudios.io/rethink-public/mongo.git@v1.0.0",
 ]
 
 [project.scripts]

src/envelope_authorizer/__init__.py

@@ -1 +1,6 @@
-__version__ = "0.1.2"
+from importlib.metadata import version, PackageNotFoundError
+
+try:
+    __version__ = version("envelope_authorizer")
+except PackageNotFoundError:
+    __version__ = "0.0.0+unknown"

src/envelope_authorizer/cli.py

@@ -2,8 +2,7 @@
 
 `config init` runs without an existing config (it writes one); every other
 command loads config and resolves a storage backend first. expected failures
-(ConfigError, CommandError, RuntimeError from a guarded backend) print a clean
-`[✘] ...` line and exit non-zero — no traceback.
+print a clean `[✘] ...` line and exit non-zero - no traceback.
 """
 
 import argparse
@@ -16,6 +15,12 @@ from .config import ConfigError, load_config
 from .commands import CommandError, authorize, config_init, init, list_keys, revoke, verify
 from .storage import resolve
 
+try:
+    from pymongo.errors import PyMongoError
+except ImportError:
+    class PyMongoError(Exception):
+        """stand-in when the [mongo] extra is not installed; never actually raised"""
+
 
 def _build_parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser:
     """construct the argument parser with all subcommands"""
@@ -73,8 +78,6 @@ def main() -> int:
                 config_init.run(None, None, args)
                 return 0
             except (CommandError, OSError) as error:
-                # config_init writes a file (cwd may be read-only, full, or gone) — an
-                # OSError must print a clean [✘] line, not a raw traceback
                 return _fail(str(error))
         parser.parse_args(["config", "--help"])
         return 0
@@ -93,11 +96,15 @@ def main() -> int:
         handlers[args.cmd](config, storage, args)
         return 0
     except InvalidTag:
-        return _fail("capability flag failed authentication — tampered or wrong DEK")
-    except (ConfigError, CommandError, RuntimeError, ValueError, OSError, KeyError, TypeError) as error:
-        # OSError covers the FileNotFoundError/PermissionError/IsADirectoryError family;
-        # KeyError/TypeError cover a structurally-malformed flag/doc (unguarded indexing
-        # of ['iv']/['meta']['authorizer']/['key']) — all print a clean [✘] line, not a traceback
+        return _fail("capability flag failed authentication - tampered or wrong DEK")
+    except PyMongoError as error:
+        return _fail(f"storage backend error: {error}")
+    except (
+        ConfigError, CommandError, RuntimeError, ValueError, OSError, KeyError, TypeError, AttributeError,
+    ) as error:
+        # covers a malformed config/doc/flag (incl. KeyError/TypeError from unguarded
+        # indexing, AttributeError from a null field a caller assumed was a dict) -
+        # all print a clean [✘] line, not a raw traceback
         return _fail(str(error))
 
 

src/envelope_authorizer/commands/__init__.py

@@ -1,9 +1,7 @@
 """command implementations + shared crypto helpers for the authorizer CLI
 
 each command module exposes `run(config, storage, args)`. helpers here own the
-recurring crypto plumbing: minting/reading the encrypted capability flag and the
-boot sequence (unwrap the local DEK and arm a crypto instance). these never
-print key material.
+capability-flag and DEK-boot plumbing; none of them print key material.
 """
 
 import time
@@ -25,7 +23,7 @@ def read_flag(crypto: EnvelopeCrypto, blob: dict) -> bool:
     """decrypt a capability flag; return the `allowed` bool
 
     fails closed: a non-dict / unexpected plaintext reads as not-allowed rather than
-    raising — a privilege gate must default to deny on a malformed flag.
+    raising - a privilege gate must default to deny on a malformed flag.
     """
     data = crypto.decrypt_data(blob)
     return bool(data.get("allowed", False)) if isinstance(data, dict) else False
@@ -53,8 +51,8 @@ def local_fingerprint(crypto: EnvelopeCrypto, config) -> str:
 def boot_local(config, storage) -> Tuple[EnvelopeCrypto, dict]:
     """unwrap the local DEK and return an armed crypto plus the local key doc
 
-    raises CommandError if this machine has no key doc (not initialized /
-    authorized here). never logs or prints the unwrapped key.
+    raises CommandError if this machine has no key doc here. never logs or
+    prints the unwrapped key.
     """
     crypto = EnvelopeCrypto()
     fingerprint = local_fingerprint(crypto, config)
@@ -63,14 +61,28 @@ def boot_local(config, storage) -> Tuple[EnvelopeCrypto, dict]:
         raise CommandError(
             "not initialized on this machine (no key doc for the local public key)"
         )
-    aes_key = crypto.decrypt_aes_key_with_rsa(doc["key"], config.private_key)
+    aes_key = crypto.decrypt_aes_key_with_rsa(
+        doc["key"], config.private_key, password=config.private_key_password
+    )
     crypto.initialize(aes_key)
     return crypto, doc
 
 
+def doc_meta(doc: dict) -> dict:
+    """the doc's meta block as a dict, coercing a missing/null/malformed one to {}
+
+    a stored doc's `meta` can be null (shared mongo, a hand-edited JSON file) - the
+    dict.get(key, {}) default only applies when the key is ABSENT, not when its
+    value is null, so every meta-reading call site must go through this rather than
+    `doc.get("meta", {})` directly or it raises AttributeError on a null meta.
+    """
+    meta = doc.get("meta")
+    return meta if isinstance(meta, dict) else {}
+
+
 def find_by_friendly(storage, friendly: str) -> Optional[dict]:
     """return the doc whose meta.friendly matches, or None"""
     for doc in storage.get_all():
-        if doc.get("meta", {}).get("friendly") == friendly:
+        if doc_meta(doc).get("friendly") == friendly:
             return doc
     return None

src/envelope_authorizer/commands/authorize.py

@@ -1,15 +1,17 @@
-"""`authorizer authorize` — grant another machine access to the DEK
+"""`authorizer authorize` - grant another machine access to the DEK
 
-boots the local DEK, verifies the local key is itself an authorizer, then wraps
-the same DEK to the target public key and stores a new key doc. `--can-authorize`
-decides whether the new key may authorize others (omit it for servers).
+refuses a target key that already has a record - `save` upserts by `_id`, so
+re-authorizing a known key would silently overwrite its flag/friendly. see
+`run()` below for the full refusal contract.
 """
 
 from . import (
     CommandError,
     boot_local,
     build_doc,
+    doc_meta,
     find_by_friendly,
+    local_fingerprint,
     make_flag,
     read_flag,
 )
@@ -25,9 +27,23 @@ def run(config, storage, args) -> None:
     if not read_flag(crypto, local_doc["meta"]["authorizer"]):
         raise CommandError("this key is not permitted to authorize others")
 
-    new_fp, new_wrapped = crypto.encrypt_aes_key_with_rsa(
-        crypto.master_key, args.key
+    new_fp = crypto.get_rsa_key_fingerprint(args.key)
+    if new_fp == local_fingerprint(crypto, config):
+        raise CommandError(
+            "target key is the local key; authorize would silently replace the "
+            "local authorizer record - use a different keypair, or `authorizer "
+            "list` if you meant to check its status"
         )
+    existing = storage.get(new_fp)
+    if existing:
+        existing_friendly = doc_meta(existing).get("friendly", "?")
+        raise CommandError(
+            f"target key is already authorized as '{existing_friendly}'; "
+            f"authorize would silently replace that record - revoke it first "
+            f"if you intend to re-authorize it"
+        )
+
+    _, new_wrapped = crypto.encrypt_aes_key_with_rsa(crypto.master_key, args.key)
     flag = make_flag(crypto, args.can_authorize)
     doc = build_doc(new_fp, new_wrapped, flag, config.identity, args.friendly)
     storage.save(doc)

src/envelope_authorizer/commands/config_init.py

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-"""`authorizer config init` — scaffold a starter .authorizer.toml in cwd"""
+"""`authorizer config init` - scaffold a starter .authorizer.toml in cwd"""
 
 from pathlib import Path
 
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ _TEMPLATE = """[keys]
 public   = "~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub"
 private  = "~/.ssh/id_rsa"
 identity = "user@hostname"
+# password = "..."          # only if the private key above is encrypted
 
 [storage]
 backend = "json"
@@ -28,7 +29,7 @@ def run(config, storage, args) -> None:
     """write a commented starter config; refuse to overwrite an existing one"""
     target = Path.cwd() / CONFIG_NAME
     if target.exists():
-        raise CommandError(f"{target} already exists — refusing to overwrite")
+        raise CommandError(f"{target} already exists - refusing to overwrite")
     with open(target, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
         handle.write(_TEMPLATE)
     print(f"[✔] Wrote starter config: {target}")

src/envelope_authorizer/commands/init.py

@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
-"""`authorizer init` — create a fresh DEK and authorize the local key
+"""`authorizer init` - create a fresh DEK and authorize the local key
 
 generates a new AES data key, wraps it to the local public key, and stores the
-first key doc marked as an authorizer (allowed: True). refuses if the system is
-already initialized or the friendly name is taken.
+first key doc marked as an authorizer (allowed: True).
 """
 
 from envelope_crypto import EnvelopeCrypto
@@ -13,11 +12,9 @@ from . import CommandError, build_doc, find_by_friendly, make_flag
 def run(config, storage, args) -> None:
     """initialize the key system on this machine as the first authorizer
 
-    the already-initialized / duplicate-friendly checks are non-atomic (a check-then-act
-    TOCTOU under two concurrent CLIs), but this is a one-shot human admin tool and `save`
-    upserts by `_id`, so key material can never collide — the worst case is a cosmetic
-    double-init under a race, which carries no security consequence in the trusted-
-    DEK-holder threat model. left non-atomic by design.
+    the already-initialized / duplicate-friendly checks are non-atomic (TOCTOU under two
+    concurrent CLIs) by design - one-shot admin tool, `save` upserts by `_id`, so the
+    worst case is a cosmetic double-init with no security consequence.
     """
     if storage.get_all():
         raise CommandError(
@@ -35,4 +32,4 @@ def run(config, storage, args) -> None:
     doc = build_doc(fingerprint, wrapped, flag, config.identity, args.friendly)
     storage.save(doc)
 
-    print(f"[✔] Initialized — fingerprint: {fingerprint} | friendly: {args.friendly} [authorizer=True]")
+    print(f"[✔] Initialized - fingerprint: {fingerprint} | friendly: {args.friendly} [authorizer=True]")

src/envelope_authorizer/commands/list_keys.py

@@ -1,38 +1,31 @@
-"""`authorizer list` — show every authorized key in a padded table
+"""`authorizer list` - show every authorized key in a padded table
 
 boots the local DEK once, then for each doc decrypts its capability flag to show
-CAN_AUTHORIZE. a doc the local key cannot unwrap shows `?` rather than crashing.
-prints only fingerprint/metadata — never the wrapped key or DEK.
+CAN_AUTHORIZE (`?` if unreadable here). prints only fingerprint/metadata - never
+the wrapped key or DEK.
 """
 
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
 
-from . import boot_local, read_flag
+from . import boot_local, doc_meta, read_flag
 
 
 def _can_authorize(crypto, doc) -> str:
-    """decrypted authority of a doc as Yes/No, or `?` if not readable here
-
-    `?` means the flag could not be read for ANY reason — the local key can't unwrap it,
-    or the doc is missing/malformed — so the table always renders rather than crashing on
-    one bad row. it is not specifically a corruption signal.
-    """
+    """decrypted authority of a doc as Yes/No, or `?` if unreadable here"""
     try:
         return "Yes" if read_flag(crypto, doc["meta"]["authorizer"]) else "No"
     except Exception:
         return "?"
 
 
-def _created(doc) -> str:
+def _created(meta: dict) -> str:
     """format created_at as a UTC timestamp string, or '-' if absent/unparseable"""
-    raw = doc.get("meta", {}).get("created_at")
+    raw = meta.get("created_at")
     if not raw:
         return "-"
     try:
         return datetime.fromtimestamp(int(raw), tz=timezone.utc).strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S")
     except (TypeError, ValueError, OverflowError, OSError):
-        # one hand-edited/legacy doc with a bad created_at shouldn't abort the
-        # whole table render
         return "-"
 
 
@@ -45,12 +38,12 @@ def run(config, storage, args) -> None:
     print(header)
     print("-" * len(header))
     for doc in docs:
-        meta = doc.get("meta", {})
+        meta = doc_meta(doc)
         print(
-            f"{doc.get('_id', '')[:16]:<18} "
+            f"{(doc.get('_id') or '')[:16]:<18} "
             f"{str(meta.get('friendly', '-')):<16} "
             f"{str(meta.get('created_by', '-')):<18} "
-            f"{_created(doc):<21} "
+            f"{_created(meta):<21} "
             f"{_can_authorize(crypto, doc):<8}"
         )
     print(f"\n{len(docs)} key(s) authorized")

src/envelope_authorizer/commands/revoke.py

@@ -1,14 +1,13 @@
-"""`authorizer revoke` — remove a key's authorization record
+"""`authorizer revoke` - remove a key's authorization record
 
 finds the target by friendly name or fingerprint prefix, refuses to revoke the
-local key, deletes the record, and prints an honesty warning that revoke is
-bookkeeping only — it does not rotate the DEK or scrub it from a machine that
-already unwrapped it.
+local key, and deletes the record. revoke is bookkeeping only - it does not
+rotate the DEK or scrub it from a machine that already unwrapped it.
 """
 
 from envelope_crypto import EnvelopeCrypto
 
-from . import CommandError, find_by_friendly, local_fingerprint
+from . import CommandError, doc_meta, find_by_friendly, local_fingerprint
 
 _WARNING = (
     "[!] Revoke removes the record only. It does NOT rotate the DEK or scrub it\n"
@@ -18,14 +17,13 @@ _WARNING = (
 
 
 def _find_by_fingerprint(storage, prefix: str):
-    """return the single doc whose `_id` starts with the given prefix, or None
+    """return the single doc whose `_id` starts with the prefix, or None
 
-    rejects an empty prefix (which would match every key) and an ambiguous prefix
-    that matches more than one key, rather than silently revoking the first match.
+    rejects an empty or ambiguous prefix instead of silently revoking the first hit.
     """
     if not prefix:
         raise CommandError("fingerprint prefix must not be empty")
-    matches = [doc for doc in storage.get_all() if doc.get("_id", "").startswith(prefix)]
+    matches = [doc for doc in storage.get_all() if (doc.get("_id") or "").startswith(prefix)]
     if len(matches) > 1:
         ids = ", ".join(d["_id"][:16] for d in matches)
         raise CommandError(f"fingerprint prefix '{prefix}' is ambiguous; matches: {ids}")
@@ -34,7 +32,7 @@ def _find_by_fingerprint(storage, prefix: str):
 
 def run(config, storage, args) -> None:
     """delete a key record by friendly or fingerprint, guarding the local key"""
-    if args.friendly:
+    if args.friendly is not None:
         doc = find_by_friendly(storage, args.friendly)
         label = args.friendly
     else:
@@ -49,6 +47,6 @@ def run(config, storage, args) -> None:
         raise CommandError("refusing to revoke the local key")
 
     storage.delete(doc["_id"])
-    friendly = doc.get("meta", {}).get("friendly", "?")
+    friendly = doc_meta(doc).get("friendly", "?")
     print(f"[✔] Revoked: {friendly} ({doc['_id'][:16]})")
     print(_WARNING)

src/envelope_authorizer/commands/verify.py

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-"""`authorizer verify` — health-check the local crypto setup
+"""`authorizer verify` - health-check the local crypto setup
 
 boots the local DEK, then runs envelope_crypto's self_test against the local
-keypair. if the installed envelope_crypto lacks self_test, falls back to a
-minimal in-CLI round-trip. never prints key material.
+keypair (falls back to a minimal in-CLI round-trip if self_test is absent).
+never prints key material.
 """
 
 from . import CommandError, boot_local
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ def run(config, storage, args) -> None:
     crypto, _ = boot_local(config, storage)
 
     if hasattr(crypto, "self_test"):
-        crypto.self_test(config.public_key, config.private_key)
+        crypto.self_test(config.public_key, config.private_key, password=config.private_key_password)
     else:
         sample = {"_authorizer_verify": "ok", "n": 12345}
         if crypto.decrypt_data(crypto.encrypt_data(sample)) != sample:

src/envelope_authorizer/config.py

@@ -1,16 +1,14 @@
 """TOML config loader for the authorizer CLI
 
-resolves a `.authorizer.toml` (cwd first, then ~), expands user paths, and
-exposes typed accessors. no defaults are baked in: a missing required field
-raises a clear error naming the field and the config path that was searched.
-the loaded config is the only place key paths, identity, and storage live —
-this lib never imports a host `config` module.
+resolves a `.authorizer.toml` (cwd first, then ~), expands `~` and `$ENV_VARS` in
+every path field, and exposes typed accessors. no defaults are baked in: a
+missing required field raises a clear error naming the field and config path.
 """
 
 import os
 import sys
 from pathlib import Path
-from typing import Any, Dict, List
+from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional
 
 if sys.version_info >= (3, 11):
     import tomllib
@@ -72,6 +70,11 @@ class Config:
         """path to the local RSA private key (expanded)"""
         return _expand(self.require("keys", "private"))
 
+    @property
+    def private_key_password(self) -> Optional[str]:
+        """passphrase for an encrypted local private key, or None if unset"""
+        return self.optional("keys", "password")
+
     @property
     def identity(self) -> str:
         """human identity stamped as created_by on every key doc"""
@@ -82,6 +85,11 @@ class Config:
         """selected storage backend name ("json" or "mongo")"""
         return self.require("storage", "backend")
 
+    @property
+    def storage_path(self) -> str:
+        """path to the JSON storage file (expanded, same as the key paths)"""
+        return _expand(self.require("storage", "path"))
+
 
 def load_config() -> Config:
     """find and parse the authorizer config, or raise with guidance

src/envelope_authorizer/storage/__init__.py

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 """storage backend resolution for the authorizer CLI
 
 `resolve(config)` reads `[storage].backend` and returns the matching sync
-StorageBackend (json or mongo). the mongo backend is guarded — importing this
+StorageBackend (json or mongo). the mongo backend is guarded - importing this
 package never requires the mongo extra; only selecting the mongo backend does.
 """
 
@@ -13,8 +13,7 @@ def resolve(config) -> StorageBackend:
     """build the storage backend named by the config, or raise on unknown"""
     backend = config.storage_backend
     if backend == "json":
-        path = config.require("storage", "path")
-        return JsonStore(path)
+        return JsonStore(config.storage_path)
     if backend == "mongo":
         from .mongo_store import MongoStore
         return MongoStore(

src/envelope_authorizer/storage/base.py

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 """abstract storage interface for authorizer key documents
 
 a backend persists key docs keyed by `_id` (the RSA fingerprint). the interface
-is intentionally sync — the CLI is a one-shot tool; an async backend (mongo)
+is intentionally sync - the CLI is a one-shot tool; an async backend (mongo)
 bridges to sync internally. `save` is an upsert by `_id`, never a duplicate-
 inserting or duplicate-raising operation.
 """

src/envelope_authorizer/storage/json_store.py

@@ -35,12 +35,7 @@ class JsonStore(StorageBackend):
         return data
 
     def _write(self, docs: List[dict]) -> None:
-        """atomically write the docs list (unique temp file then replace)
-
-        the temp name is unique per write (tempfile.mkstemp in the same dir) so two
-        concurrent writers can't clobber a shared `.tmp`; os.replace is atomic on the
-        same filesystem. the temp is cleaned up if the write fails before replace.
-        """
+        """atomically write the docs list via a unique temp file then os.replace"""
         self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
         fd, tmp = tempfile.mkstemp(
             dir=self.path.parent, prefix=self.path.name + ".", suffix=".tmp"
@@ -48,14 +43,12 @@ class JsonStore(StorageBackend):
         wrapped = False
         try:
             with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
-                wrapped = True  # fdopen took ownership of fd; its close() handles it
+                wrapped = True
                 json.dump(docs, handle, indent=2)
                 handle.write("\n")
             os.replace(tmp, self.path)
         except BaseException:
             if not wrapped:
-                # fdopen raised before taking ownership — close the raw fd ourselves so
-                # it isn't leaked (the `with` only closes once fdopen returns a file object)
                 try:
                     os.close(fd)
                 except OSError:

src/envelope_authorizer/storage/mongo_store.py

@@ -1,19 +1,15 @@
 """mongo storage backend (behind the [mongo] extra)
 
-bridges the async rethink-public `mongo` lib to the sync StorageBackend by
-wrapping each operation in its own asyncio.run: connect -> op -> close, fully
-self-contained per call. no module-level client and no shared event loop, so it
-never collides with a running loop. a per-call connect is an accepted tradeoff
-for a one-shot admin CLI. requires envelope_authorizer[mongo]; without it every
-method raises a clear RuntimeError.
+bridges the async rethink-public `mongo` lib to the sync StorageBackend: each op
+gets its own asyncio.run (connect -> op -> close), no module-level client or
+shared loop. requires envelope_authorizer[mongo]; without it every method raises
+a clear RuntimeError.
 
-fail-loud: operations go through the mongo lib's RAW collection escape hatch
-(`db.collection(name)`, the motor collection — which raises) rather than the
-swallow-and-return-default wrapped methods. this is an auth backend; conflating
-a backend error with "no document / not initialized" in the thing that gates
-authority is the worst place for the swallow anti-pattern, so a driver error
-propagates and a no-op upsert raises instead of silently reporting success.
-`close()` is synchronous on the mongo lib (motor's close is sync) — not awaited.
+fail-loud: ops go through the mongo lib's raw collection escape hatch, not the
+swallow-and-default wrapped methods - this is an auth backend, so a driver error
+must never read as "not initialized," and a no-op upsert raises instead of
+silently reporting success. `close()` is synchronous on the mongo lib - not
+awaited.
 """
 
 import asyncio