fix: EA-1 refuse authorize of an already-recorded key (v0.1.3)

authorize never checked the target fingerprint against existing docs before
save()'s upsert-by-_id, so authorizing the local machine's own public key
under a new friendly name silently replaced the local authorizer record
(can_authorize demoted to False) while printing a success banner. With a
sole authorizer this bricks the CLI: authorize refuses (not permitted),
init refuses (already initialized), and revoke of the local key refuses
(refusing to revoke the local key) -- no in-CLI recovery. Mirror revoke's
local-key guard and extend it to any existing _id, so a duplicate target
is refused with a clear message instead of silently replacing the record.

Signed-off-by: disqualifier <dev@disqualifier.me>

.gitignore

@@ -5,4 +5,4 @@ dist/
 build/
 .venv/
 .pytest_cache/
-CLAUDE.md
+.claude/

README.md

@@ -13,25 +13,27 @@ authorization system and the key-document schema; the crypto primitives live in
 ## Install
 
 ```
-envelope_authorizer @ git+ssh://git@git.rethinkstudios.io/rethink-public/envelope_authorizer.git@v0.1.1
+envelope_authorizer @ git+ssh://git@git.rethinkstudios.io/rethink-public/envelope_authorizer.git@v0.1.3
 ```
 
 Direct:
 
 ```bash
-pip install "envelope_authorizer @ git+ssh://git@git.rethinkstudios.io/rethink-public/envelope_authorizer.git@v0.1.1"
+pip install "envelope_authorizer @ git+ssh://git@git.rethinkstudios.io/rethink-public/envelope_authorizer.git@v0.1.3"
 ```
 
 The base install uses a local JSON file for storage (stdlib only). For shared
 dev→server storage, install the mongo extra:
 
 ```bash
-pip install "envelope_authorizer[mongo] @ git+ssh://git@git.rethinkstudios.io/rethink-public/envelope_authorizer.git@v0.1.1"
+pip install "envelope_authorizer[mongo] @ git+ssh://git@git.rethinkstudios.io/rethink-public/envelope_authorizer.git@v0.1.3"
 ```
 
 Installing pulls `envelope_crypto` (and `mongo` with the extra). After install,
 the `authorizer` command is on your PATH; `python -m envelope_authorizer` also works.
 
+Drop the `@v0.1.3` suffix from the line above to install the latest unpinned.
+
 ## Trust model (read this)
 
 There is one shared **AES data-encryption key (DEK)** per project. Each key doc
@@ -127,7 +129,11 @@ initialized or the friendly name is taken.
 Boots the local DEK, verifies the local key is itself an authorizer, then wraps
 the same DEK to the target public key and stores a new key doc. Omit
 `--can-authorize` for servers (`allowed: False`); pass it only for trusted
-dev/home machines.
+dev/home machines. Refuses a target key whose fingerprint already has a record
+(most importantly the local key itself) — `save` upserts by `_id`, so
+authorizing an already-known key would silently replace its existing doc
+(capability flag and friendly name) under a success banner instead of adding a
+new key. Revoke the existing record first if you intend to re-authorize it.
 
 ```
 [✔] Authorized Jy7k2ey7... | friendly: server1 [can_authorize=False]
@@ -222,5 +228,4 @@ Owned by this lib (not `envelope_crypto`):
 
 ## Versioning
 
-Tagged `vX.Y.Z`. Pin the tag. `envelope_crypto` is pinned at `v0.1.0` in
+Releases are tagged `vX.Y.Z`. The install line above pins a release; drop the `@vX.Y.Z` suffix to install the latest unpinned. Pin deliberately for reproducible installs.
-`pyproject.toml`; to change it, edit the pin and re-test.

pyproject.toml

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ build-backend = "hatchling.build"
 
 [project]
 name = "envelope_authorizer"
-version = "0.1.1"
+version = "0.1.3"
 description = "CLI key-authorization manager for envelope_crypto"
 requires-python = ">=3.10"
 dependencies = [

src/envelope_authorizer/__init__.py

@@ -1 +1 @@
-__version__ = "0.1.1"
+__version__ = "0.1.3"

src/envelope_authorizer/cli.py

@@ -72,7 +72,9 @@ def main() -> int:
             try:
                 config_init.run(None, None, args)
                 return 0
-            except CommandError as error:
+            except (CommandError, OSError) as error:
+                # config_init writes a file (cwd may be read-only, full, or gone) — an
+                # OSError must print a clean [✘] line, not a raw traceback
                 return _fail(str(error))
         parser.parse_args(["config", "--help"])
         return 0
@@ -92,7 +94,10 @@ def main() -> int:
         return 0
     except InvalidTag:
         return _fail("capability flag failed authentication — tampered or wrong DEK")
-    except (ConfigError, CommandError, RuntimeError, ValueError, FileNotFoundError) as error:
+    except (ConfigError, CommandError, RuntimeError, ValueError, OSError, KeyError, TypeError) as error:
+        # OSError covers the FileNotFoundError/PermissionError/IsADirectoryError family;
+        # KeyError/TypeError cover a structurally-malformed flag/doc (unguarded indexing
+        # of ['iv']/['meta']['authorizer']/['key']) — all print a clean [✘] line, not a traceback
         return _fail(str(error))
 
 

src/envelope_authorizer/commands/__init__.py

@@ -22,7 +22,11 @@ def make_flag(crypto: EnvelopeCrypto, allowed: bool) -> dict:
 
 
 def read_flag(crypto: EnvelopeCrypto, blob: dict) -> bool:
-    """decrypt a capability flag; return the `allowed` bool"""
+    """decrypt a capability flag; return the `allowed` bool
+
+    fails closed: a non-dict / unexpected plaintext reads as not-allowed rather than
+    raising — a privilege gate must default to deny on a malformed flag.
+    """
     data = crypto.decrypt_data(blob)
     return bool(data.get("allowed", False)) if isinstance(data, dict) else False
 

src/envelope_authorizer/commands/authorize.py

@@ -2,7 +2,11 @@
 
 boots the local DEK, verifies the local key is itself an authorizer, then wraps
 the same DEK to the target public key and stores a new key doc. `--can-authorize`
-decides whether the new key may authorize others (omit it for servers).
+decides whether the new key may authorize others (omit it for servers). Refuses
+a target key that fingerprints to an existing `_id` — `save` upserts by `_id`, so
+authorizing a key that is already on record (most dangerously the local key
+itself) would silently replace that doc's capability flag and friendly name
+under a success banner instead of adding a new key.
 """
 
 from . import (
@@ -10,6 +14,7 @@ from . import (
     boot_local,
     build_doc,
     find_by_friendly,
+    local_fingerprint,
     make_flag,
     read_flag,
 )
@@ -25,9 +30,23 @@ def run(config, storage, args) -> None:
     if not read_flag(crypto, local_doc["meta"]["authorizer"]):
         raise CommandError("this key is not permitted to authorize others")
 
-    new_fp, new_wrapped = crypto.encrypt_aes_key_with_rsa(
+    new_fp = crypto.get_rsa_key_fingerprint(args.key)
-        crypto.master_key, args.key
+    if new_fp == local_fingerprint(crypto, config):
-    )
+        raise CommandError(
+            "target key is the local key; authorize would silently replace the "
+            "local authorizer record — use a different keypair, or `authorizer "
+            "list` if you meant to check its status"
+        )
+    existing = storage.get(new_fp)
+    if existing:
+        existing_friendly = existing.get("meta", {}).get("friendly", "?")
+        raise CommandError(
+            f"target key is already authorized as '{existing_friendly}'; "
+            f"authorize would silently replace that record — revoke it first "
+            f"if you intend to re-authorize it"
+        )
+
+    _, new_wrapped = crypto.encrypt_aes_key_with_rsa(crypto.master_key, args.key)
     flag = make_flag(crypto, args.can_authorize)
     doc = build_doc(new_fp, new_wrapped, flag, config.identity, args.friendly)
     storage.save(doc)

src/envelope_authorizer/commands/init.py

@@ -11,7 +11,14 @@ from . import CommandError, build_doc, find_by_friendly, make_flag
 
 
 def run(config, storage, args) -> None:
-    """initialize the key system on this machine as the first authorizer"""
+    """initialize the key system on this machine as the first authorizer
+
+    the already-initialized / duplicate-friendly checks are non-atomic (a check-then-act
+    TOCTOU under two concurrent CLIs), but this is a one-shot human admin tool and `save`
+    upserts by `_id`, so key material can never collide — the worst case is a cosmetic
+    double-init under a race, which carries no security consequence in the trusted-
+    DEK-holder threat model. left non-atomic by design.
+    """
     if storage.get_all():
         raise CommandError(
             "already initialized; use `authorizer list` to see existing keys"

src/envelope_authorizer/commands/list_keys.py

@@ -11,7 +11,12 @@ from . import boot_local, read_flag
 
 
 def _can_authorize(crypto, doc) -> str:
-    """decrypted authority of a doc as Yes/No, or `?` if not readable here"""
+    """decrypted authority of a doc as Yes/No, or `?` if not readable here
+
+    `?` means the flag could not be read for ANY reason — the local key can't unwrap it,
+    or the doc is missing/malformed — so the table always renders rather than crashing on
+    one bad row. it is not specifically a corruption signal.
+    """
     try:
         return "Yes" if read_flag(crypto, doc["meta"]["authorizer"]) else "No"
     except Exception:

src/envelope_authorizer/commands/revoke.py

@@ -18,11 +18,18 @@ _WARNING = (
 
 
 def _find_by_fingerprint(storage, prefix: str):
-    """return the doc whose `_id` starts with the given prefix, or None"""
+    """return the single doc whose `_id` starts with the given prefix, or None
-    for doc in storage.get_all():
+
-        if doc.get("_id", "").startswith(prefix):
+    rejects an empty prefix (which would match every key) and an ambiguous prefix
-            return doc
+    that matches more than one key, rather than silently revoking the first match.
-    return None
+    """
+    if not prefix:
+        raise CommandError("fingerprint prefix must not be empty")
+    matches = [doc for doc in storage.get_all() if doc.get("_id", "").startswith(prefix)]
+    if len(matches) > 1:
+        ids = ", ".join(d["_id"][:16] for d in matches)
+        raise CommandError(f"fingerprint prefix '{prefix}' is ambiguous; matches: {ids}")
+    return matches[0] if matches else None
 
 
 def run(config, storage, args) -> None:

src/envelope_authorizer/storage/json_store.py

@@ -45,12 +45,21 @@ class JsonStore(StorageBackend):
         fd, tmp = tempfile.mkstemp(
             dir=self.path.parent, prefix=self.path.name + ".", suffix=".tmp"
         )
+        wrapped = False
         try:
             with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+                wrapped = True  # fdopen took ownership of fd; its close() handles it
                 json.dump(docs, handle, indent=2)
                 handle.write("\n")
             os.replace(tmp, self.path)
         except BaseException:
+            if not wrapped:
+                # fdopen raised before taking ownership — close the raw fd ourselves so
+                # it isn't leaked (the `with` only closes once fdopen returns a file object)
+                try:
+                    os.close(fd)
+                except OSError:
+                    pass
             try:
                 os.unlink(tmp)
             except OSError: