.gitignore

@@ -5,4 +5,4 @@ dist/
 build/
 .venv/
 .pytest_cache/
-.claude/
+CLAUDE.md

README.md

@@ -13,27 +13,25 @@ authorization system and the key-document schema; the crypto primitives live in
 ## Install
 
 ```
-envelope_authorizer @ git+ssh://git@git.rethinkstudios.io/rethink-public/envelope_authorizer.git@v0.1.2
+envelope_authorizer @ git+ssh://git@git.rethinkstudios.io/rethink-public/envelope_authorizer.git@v0.1.1
 ```
 
 Direct:
 
 ```bash
-pip install "envelope_authorizer @ git+ssh://git@git.rethinkstudios.io/rethink-public/envelope_authorizer.git@v0.1.2"
+pip install "envelope_authorizer @ git+ssh://git@git.rethinkstudios.io/rethink-public/envelope_authorizer.git@v0.1.1"
 ```
 
 The base install uses a local JSON file for storage (stdlib only). For shared
 dev→server storage, install the mongo extra:
 
 ```bash
-pip install "envelope_authorizer[mongo] @ git+ssh://git@git.rethinkstudios.io/rethink-public/envelope_authorizer.git@v0.1.2"
+pip install "envelope_authorizer[mongo] @ git+ssh://git@git.rethinkstudios.io/rethink-public/envelope_authorizer.git@v0.1.1"
 ```
 
 Installing pulls `envelope_crypto` (and `mongo` with the extra). After install,
 the `authorizer` command is on your PATH; `python -m envelope_authorizer` also works.
 
-Drop the `@v0.1.2` suffix from the line above to install the latest unpinned.
-
 ## Trust model (read this)
 
 There is one shared **AES data-encryption key (DEK)** per project. Each key doc
@@ -224,4 +222,5 @@ Owned by this lib (not `envelope_crypto`):
 
 ## Versioning
 
-Releases are tagged `vX.Y.Z`. The install line above pins a release; drop the `@vX.Y.Z` suffix to install the latest unpinned. Pin deliberately for reproducible installs.
+Tagged `vX.Y.Z`. Pin the tag. `envelope_crypto` is pinned at `v0.1.0` in
+`pyproject.toml`; to change it, edit the pin and re-test.

pyproject.toml

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ build-backend = "hatchling.build"
 
 [project]
 name = "envelope_authorizer"
-version = "0.1.2"
+version = "0.1.1"
 description = "CLI key-authorization manager for envelope_crypto"
 requires-python = ">=3.10"
 dependencies = [

src/envelope_authorizer/__init__.py

@@ -1 +1 @@
-__version__ = "0.1.2"
+__version__ = "0.1.1"

src/envelope_authorizer/cli.py

@@ -72,9 +72,7 @@ def main() -> int:
             try:
                 config_init.run(None, None, args)
                 return 0
-            except (CommandError, OSError) as error:
+            except CommandError as error:
-                # config_init writes a file (cwd may be read-only, full, or gone) — an
-                # OSError must print a clean [✘] line, not a raw traceback
                 return _fail(str(error))
         parser.parse_args(["config", "--help"])
         return 0
@@ -94,10 +92,7 @@ def main() -> int:
         return 0
     except InvalidTag:
         return _fail("capability flag failed authentication — tampered or wrong DEK")
-    except (ConfigError, CommandError, RuntimeError, ValueError, OSError, KeyError, TypeError) as error:
+    except (ConfigError, CommandError, RuntimeError, ValueError, FileNotFoundError) as error:
-        # OSError covers the FileNotFoundError/PermissionError/IsADirectoryError family;
-        # KeyError/TypeError cover a structurally-malformed flag/doc (unguarded indexing
-        # of ['iv']/['meta']['authorizer']/['key']) — all print a clean [✘] line, not a traceback
         return _fail(str(error))
 
 

src/envelope_authorizer/commands/__init__.py

@@ -22,11 +22,7 @@ def make_flag(crypto: EnvelopeCrypto, allowed: bool) -> dict:
 
 
 def read_flag(crypto: EnvelopeCrypto, blob: dict) -> bool:
-    """decrypt a capability flag; return the `allowed` bool
+    """decrypt a capability flag; return the `allowed` bool"""
-
-    fails closed: a non-dict / unexpected plaintext reads as not-allowed rather than
-    raising — a privilege gate must default to deny on a malformed flag.
-    """
     data = crypto.decrypt_data(blob)
     return bool(data.get("allowed", False)) if isinstance(data, dict) else False
 

src/envelope_authorizer/commands/init.py

@@ -11,14 +11,7 @@ from . import CommandError, build_doc, find_by_friendly, make_flag
 
 
 def run(config, storage, args) -> None:
-    """initialize the key system on this machine as the first authorizer
+    """initialize the key system on this machine as the first authorizer"""
-
-    the already-initialized / duplicate-friendly checks are non-atomic (a check-then-act
-    TOCTOU under two concurrent CLIs), but this is a one-shot human admin tool and `save`
-    upserts by `_id`, so key material can never collide — the worst case is a cosmetic
-    double-init under a race, which carries no security consequence in the trusted-
-    DEK-holder threat model. left non-atomic by design.
-    """
     if storage.get_all():
         raise CommandError(
             "already initialized; use `authorizer list` to see existing keys"

src/envelope_authorizer/commands/list_keys.py

@@ -11,12 +11,7 @@ from . import boot_local, read_flag
 
 
 def _can_authorize(crypto, doc) -> str:
-    """decrypted authority of a doc as Yes/No, or `?` if not readable here
+    """decrypted authority of a doc as Yes/No, or `?` if not readable here"""
-
-    `?` means the flag could not be read for ANY reason — the local key can't unwrap it,
-    or the doc is missing/malformed — so the table always renders rather than crashing on
-    one bad row. it is not specifically a corruption signal.
-    """
     try:
         return "Yes" if read_flag(crypto, doc["meta"]["authorizer"]) else "No"
     except Exception:

src/envelope_authorizer/commands/revoke.py

@@ -18,18 +18,11 @@ _WARNING = (
 
 
 def _find_by_fingerprint(storage, prefix: str):
-    """return the single doc whose `_id` starts with the given prefix, or None
+    """return the doc whose `_id` starts with the given prefix, or None"""
-
+    for doc in storage.get_all():
-    rejects an empty prefix (which would match every key) and an ambiguous prefix
+        if doc.get("_id", "").startswith(prefix):
-    that matches more than one key, rather than silently revoking the first match.
+            return doc
-    """
+    return None
-    if not prefix:
-        raise CommandError("fingerprint prefix must not be empty")
-    matches = [doc for doc in storage.get_all() if doc.get("_id", "").startswith(prefix)]
-    if len(matches) > 1:
-        ids = ", ".join(d["_id"][:16] for d in matches)
-        raise CommandError(f"fingerprint prefix '{prefix}' is ambiguous; matches: {ids}")
-    return matches[0] if matches else None
 
 
 def run(config, storage, args) -> None:

src/envelope_authorizer/storage/json_store.py

@@ -45,21 +45,12 @@ class JsonStore(StorageBackend):
         fd, tmp = tempfile.mkstemp(
             dir=self.path.parent, prefix=self.path.name + ".", suffix=".tmp"
         )
-        wrapped = False
         try:
             with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
-                wrapped = True  # fdopen took ownership of fd; its close() handles it
                 json.dump(docs, handle, indent=2)
                 handle.write("\n")
             os.replace(tmp, self.path)
         except BaseException:
-            if not wrapped:
-                # fdopen raised before taking ownership — close the raw fd ourselves so
-                # it isn't leaked (the `with` only closes once fdopen returns a file object)
-                try:
-                    os.close(fd)
-                except OSError:
-                    pass
             try:
                 os.unlink(tmp)
             except OSError: