chore: bump to 1.1.0 (D5 logging fix)

Signed-off-by: disqualifier <dev@disqualifier.me>

README.md

@@ -13,26 +13,26 @@ authorization system and the key-document schema; the crypto primitives live in
 ## Install
 
 ```
-envelope_authorizer @ git+ssh://git@git.rethinkstudios.io/rethink-public/envelope_authorizer.git@v0.1.5
+envelope_authorizer @ git+ssh://git@git.rethinkstudios.io/rethink-public/envelope_authorizer.git@v1.0.2
 ```
 
 Direct:
 
 ```bash
-pip install "envelope_authorizer @ git+ssh://git@git.rethinkstudios.io/rethink-public/envelope_authorizer.git@v0.1.5"
+pip install "envelope_authorizer @ git+ssh://git@git.rethinkstudios.io/rethink-public/envelope_authorizer.git@v1.0.2"
 ```
 
 The base install uses a local JSON file for storage (stdlib only). For shared
 dev→server storage, install the mongo extra:
 
 ```bash
-pip install "envelope_authorizer[mongo] @ git+ssh://git@git.rethinkstudios.io/rethink-public/envelope_authorizer.git@v0.1.5"
+pip install "envelope_authorizer[mongo] @ git+ssh://git@git.rethinkstudios.io/rethink-public/envelope_authorizer.git@v1.0.2"
 ```
 
 Installing pulls `envelope_crypto` (and `mongo` with the extra). After install,
 the `authorizer` command is on your PATH; `python -m envelope_authorizer` also works.
 
-Drop the `@v0.1.5` suffix from the line above to install the latest unpinned.
+Drop the `@v1.0.2` suffix from the line above to install the latest unpinned.
 
 ## Trust model (read this)
 

pyproject.toml

@@ -4,17 +4,18 @@ build-backend = "hatchling.build"
 
 [project]
 name = "envelope_authorizer"
-version = "0.1.5"
+version = "1.1.0"
 description = "CLI key-authorization manager for envelope_crypto"
 requires-python = ">=3.10"
 dependencies = [
-    "envelope_crypto @ git+ssh://git@git.rethinkstudios.io/rethink-public/envelope_crypto.git",
+    "envelope_crypto @ git+https://git.rethinkstudios.io/rethink-public/envelope_crypto.git@v1.0.0",
+    "cryptography>=42.0",
     "tomli>=2.0; python_version<'3.11'",
 ]
 
 [project.optional-dependencies]
 mongo = [
-    "mongo @ git+ssh://git@git.rethinkstudios.io/rethink-public/mongo.git@v0.1.0",
+    "mongo @ git+https://git.rethinkstudios.io/rethink-public/mongo.git@v1.0.0",
 ]
 
 [project.scripts]

src/envelope_authorizer/__init__.py

@@ -1 +1,6 @@
-__version__ = "0.1.5"
+from importlib.metadata import version, PackageNotFoundError
+
+try:
+    __version__ = version("envelope_authorizer")
+except PackageNotFoundError:
+    __version__ = "0.0.0+unknown"

src/envelope_authorizer/cli.py

@@ -2,8 +2,7 @@
 
 `config init` runs without an existing config (it writes one); every other
 command loads config and resolves a storage backend first. expected failures
-(ConfigError, CommandError, RuntimeError from a guarded backend) print a clean
+print a clean `[✘] ...` line and exit non-zero - no traceback.
-`[✘] ...` line and exit non-zero — no traceback.
 """
 
 import argparse
@@ -79,8 +78,6 @@ def main() -> int:
                 config_init.run(None, None, args)
                 return 0
             except (CommandError, OSError) as error:
-                # config_init writes a file (cwd may be read-only, full, or gone) — an
-                # OSError must print a clean [✘] line, not a raw traceback
                 return _fail(str(error))
         parser.parse_args(["config", "--help"])
         return 0
@@ -99,13 +96,15 @@ def main() -> int:
         handlers[args.cmd](config, storage, args)
         return 0
     except InvalidTag:
-        return _fail("capability flag failed authentication — tampered or wrong DEK")
+        return _fail("capability flag failed authentication - tampered or wrong DEK")
     except PyMongoError as error:
         return _fail(f"storage backend error: {error}")
-    except (ConfigError, CommandError, RuntimeError, ValueError, OSError, KeyError, TypeError) as error:
+    except (
-        # OSError covers the FileNotFoundError/PermissionError/IsADirectoryError family;
+        ConfigError, CommandError, RuntimeError, ValueError, OSError, KeyError, TypeError, AttributeError,
-        # KeyError/TypeError cover a structurally-malformed flag/doc (unguarded indexing
+    ) as error:
-        # of ['iv']/['meta']['authorizer']/['key']) — all print a clean [✘] line, not a traceback
+        # covers a malformed config/doc/flag (incl. KeyError/TypeError from unguarded
+        # indexing, AttributeError from a null field a caller assumed was a dict) -
+        # all print a clean [✘] line, not a raw traceback
         return _fail(str(error))
 
 

src/envelope_authorizer/commands/__init__.py

@@ -1,9 +1,7 @@
 """command implementations + shared crypto helpers for the authorizer CLI
 
 each command module exposes `run(config, storage, args)`. helpers here own the
-recurring crypto plumbing: minting/reading the encrypted capability flag and the
+capability-flag and DEK-boot plumbing; none of them print key material.
-boot sequence (unwrap the local DEK and arm a crypto instance). these never
-print key material.
 """
 
 import time
@@ -25,7 +23,7 @@ def read_flag(crypto: EnvelopeCrypto, blob: dict) -> bool:
     """decrypt a capability flag; return the `allowed` bool
 
     fails closed: a non-dict / unexpected plaintext reads as not-allowed rather than
-    raising — a privilege gate must default to deny on a malformed flag.
+    raising - a privilege gate must default to deny on a malformed flag.
     """
     data = crypto.decrypt_data(blob)
     return bool(data.get("allowed", False)) if isinstance(data, dict) else False
@@ -53,8 +51,8 @@ def local_fingerprint(crypto: EnvelopeCrypto, config) -> str:
 def boot_local(config, storage) -> Tuple[EnvelopeCrypto, dict]:
     """unwrap the local DEK and return an armed crypto plus the local key doc
 
-    raises CommandError if this machine has no key doc (not initialized /
+    raises CommandError if this machine has no key doc here. never logs or
-    authorized here). never logs or prints the unwrapped key.
+    prints the unwrapped key.
     """
     crypto = EnvelopeCrypto()
     fingerprint = local_fingerprint(crypto, config)
@@ -70,9 +68,21 @@ def boot_local(config, storage) -> Tuple[EnvelopeCrypto, dict]:
     return crypto, doc
 
 
+def doc_meta(doc: dict) -> dict:
+    """the doc's meta block as a dict, coercing a missing/null/malformed one to {}
+
+    a stored doc's `meta` can be null (shared mongo, a hand-edited JSON file) - the
+    dict.get(key, {}) default only applies when the key is ABSENT, not when its
+    value is null, so every meta-reading call site must go through this rather than
+    `doc.get("meta", {})` directly or it raises AttributeError on a null meta.
+    """
+    meta = doc.get("meta")
+    return meta if isinstance(meta, dict) else {}
+
+
 def find_by_friendly(storage, friendly: str) -> Optional[dict]:
     """return the doc whose meta.friendly matches, or None"""
     for doc in storage.get_all():
-        if doc.get("meta", {}).get("friendly") == friendly:
+        if doc_meta(doc).get("friendly") == friendly:
             return doc
     return None

src/envelope_authorizer/commands/authorize.py

@@ -1,17 +1,15 @@
-"""`authorizer authorize` — grant another machine access to the DEK
+"""`authorizer authorize` - grant another machine access to the DEK
 
-boots the local DEK, verifies the local key is itself an authorizer, then wraps
+refuses a target key that already has a record - `save` upserts by `_id`, so
-the same DEK to the target public key and stores a new key doc. `--can-authorize`
+re-authorizing a known key would silently overwrite its flag/friendly. see
-decides whether the new key may authorize others (omit it for servers). Refuses
+`run()` below for the full refusal contract.
-a target key that already has a record — `save` upserts by `_id`, so re-authorizing
-a known key (most dangerously the local key itself) would silently overwrite its
-flag/friendly under a success banner instead of adding a new key.
 """
 
 from . import (
     CommandError,
     boot_local,
     build_doc,
+    doc_meta,
     find_by_friendly,
     local_fingerprint,
     make_flag,
@@ -33,15 +31,15 @@ def run(config, storage, args) -> None:
     if new_fp == local_fingerprint(crypto, config):
         raise CommandError(
             "target key is the local key; authorize would silently replace the "
-            "local authorizer record — use a different keypair, or `authorizer "
+            "local authorizer record - use a different keypair, or `authorizer "
             "list` if you meant to check its status"
         )
     existing = storage.get(new_fp)
     if existing:
-        existing_friendly = existing.get("meta", {}).get("friendly", "?")
+        existing_friendly = doc_meta(existing).get("friendly", "?")
         raise CommandError(
             f"target key is already authorized as '{existing_friendly}'; "
-            f"authorize would silently replace that record — revoke it first "
+            f"authorize would silently replace that record - revoke it first "
             f"if you intend to re-authorize it"
         )
 

src/envelope_authorizer/commands/config_init.py

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-"""`authorizer config init` — scaffold a starter .authorizer.toml in cwd"""
+"""`authorizer config init` - scaffold a starter .authorizer.toml in cwd"""
 
 from pathlib import Path
 
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ def run(config, storage, args) -> None:
     """write a commented starter config; refuse to overwrite an existing one"""
     target = Path.cwd() / CONFIG_NAME
     if target.exists():
-        raise CommandError(f"{target} already exists — refusing to overwrite")
+        raise CommandError(f"{target} already exists - refusing to overwrite")
     with open(target, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
         handle.write(_TEMPLATE)
     print(f"[✔] Wrote starter config: {target}")

src/envelope_authorizer/commands/init.py

@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
-"""`authorizer init` — create a fresh DEK and authorize the local key
+"""`authorizer init` - create a fresh DEK and authorize the local key
 
 generates a new AES data key, wraps it to the local public key, and stores the
-first key doc marked as an authorizer (allowed: True). refuses if the system is
+first key doc marked as an authorizer (allowed: True).
-already initialized or the friendly name is taken.
 """
 
 from envelope_crypto import EnvelopeCrypto
@@ -14,7 +13,7 @@ def run(config, storage, args) -> None:
     """initialize the key system on this machine as the first authorizer
 
     the already-initialized / duplicate-friendly checks are non-atomic (TOCTOU under two
-    concurrent CLIs) by design — one-shot admin tool, `save` upserts by `_id`, so the
+    concurrent CLIs) by design - one-shot admin tool, `save` upserts by `_id`, so the
     worst case is a cosmetic double-init with no security consequence.
     """
     if storage.get_all():
@@ -33,4 +32,4 @@ def run(config, storage, args) -> None:
     doc = build_doc(fingerprint, wrapped, flag, config.identity, args.friendly)
     storage.save(doc)
 
-    print(f"[✔] Initialized — fingerprint: {fingerprint} | friendly: {args.friendly} [authorizer=True]")
+    print(f"[✔] Initialized - fingerprint: {fingerprint} | friendly: {args.friendly} [authorizer=True]")

src/envelope_authorizer/commands/list_keys.py

@@ -1,31 +1,36 @@
-"""`authorizer list` — show every authorized key in a padded table
+"""`authorizer list` - show every authorized key in a padded table
 
 boots the local DEK once, then for each doc decrypts its capability flag to show
-CAN_AUTHORIZE. a doc the local key cannot unwrap shows `?` rather than crashing.
+CAN_AUTHORIZE (`?` if unreadable here). prints only fingerprint/metadata - never
-prints only fingerprint/metadata — never the wrapped key or DEK.
+the wrapped key or DEK.
 """
 
+import logging
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
 
-from . import boot_local, read_flag
+from cryptography.exceptions import InvalidTag
+
+from . import boot_local, doc_meta, read_flag
+
+log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
 
 def _can_authorize(crypto, doc) -> str:
     """decrypted authority of a doc as Yes/No, or `?` if unreadable here
 
-    `?` covers any failure (unwrap mismatch, missing/malformed doc) so the table
+    a malformed/foreign flag degrades to `?` for display continuity. a GCM auth-tag
-    always renders instead of crashing on one bad row.
+    failure is logged first (WARNING): it is either a foreign key this host can't
+    decrypt or a tampered authz record, and this layer can't tell them apart, so the
+    security signal must stay visible rather than render identically to a `?`.
     """
     try:
         return "Yes" if read_flag(crypto, doc["meta"]["authorizer"]) else "No"
-    except Exception:
+    except (KeyError, TypeError, ValueError):
+        return "?"
+    except InvalidTag:
+        friendly = doc_meta(doc).get("friendly", doc.get("_id", "?"))
+        log.warning("auth-tag verification failed for flag %s - foreign key or tampered record", friendly)
         return "?"
-
-
-def _meta(doc) -> dict:
-    """the doc's meta block as a dict, coercing a missing/null/malformed one to {}"""
-    meta = doc.get("meta")
-    return meta if isinstance(meta, dict) else {}
 
 
 def _created(meta: dict) -> str:
@@ -36,8 +41,6 @@ def _created(meta: dict) -> str:
     try:
         return datetime.fromtimestamp(int(raw), tz=timezone.utc).strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S")
     except (TypeError, ValueError, OverflowError, OSError):
-        # one hand-edited/legacy doc with a bad created_at shouldn't abort the
-        # whole table render
         return "-"
 
 
@@ -50,9 +53,9 @@ def run(config, storage, args) -> None:
     print(header)
     print("-" * len(header))
     for doc in docs:
-        meta = _meta(doc)
+        meta = doc_meta(doc)
         print(
-            f"{doc.get('_id', '')[:16]:<18} "
+            f"{(doc.get('_id') or '')[:16]:<18} "
             f"{str(meta.get('friendly', '-')):<16} "
             f"{str(meta.get('created_by', '-')):<18} "
             f"{_created(meta):<21} "

src/envelope_authorizer/commands/revoke.py

@@ -1,14 +1,13 @@
-"""`authorizer revoke` — remove a key's authorization record
+"""`authorizer revoke` - remove a key's authorization record
 
 finds the target by friendly name or fingerprint prefix, refuses to revoke the
-local key, deletes the record, and prints an honesty warning that revoke is
+local key, and deletes the record. revoke is bookkeeping only - it does not
-bookkeeping only — it does not rotate the DEK or scrub it from a machine that
+rotate the DEK or scrub it from a machine that already unwrapped it.
-already unwrapped it.
 """
 
 from envelope_crypto import EnvelopeCrypto
 
-from . import CommandError, find_by_friendly, local_fingerprint
+from . import CommandError, doc_meta, find_by_friendly, local_fingerprint
 
 _WARNING = (
     "[!] Revoke removes the record only. It does NOT rotate the DEK or scrub it\n"
@@ -18,14 +17,13 @@ _WARNING = (
 
 
 def _find_by_fingerprint(storage, prefix: str):
-    """return the single doc whose `_id` starts with the given prefix, or None
+    """return the single doc whose `_id` starts with the prefix, or None
 
-    rejects an empty prefix (matches everything) and an ambiguous one (matches
+    rejects an empty or ambiguous prefix instead of silently revoking the first hit.
-    more than one key) instead of silently revoking the first hit.
     """
     if not prefix:
         raise CommandError("fingerprint prefix must not be empty")
-    matches = [doc for doc in storage.get_all() if doc.get("_id", "").startswith(prefix)]
+    matches = [doc for doc in storage.get_all() if (doc.get("_id") or "").startswith(prefix)]
     if len(matches) > 1:
         ids = ", ".join(d["_id"][:16] for d in matches)
         raise CommandError(f"fingerprint prefix '{prefix}' is ambiguous; matches: {ids}")
@@ -49,6 +47,6 @@ def run(config, storage, args) -> None:
         raise CommandError("refusing to revoke the local key")
 
     storage.delete(doc["_id"])
-    friendly = doc.get("meta", {}).get("friendly", "?")
+    friendly = doc_meta(doc).get("friendly", "?")
     print(f"[✔] Revoked: {friendly} ({doc['_id'][:16]})")
     print(_WARNING)

src/envelope_authorizer/commands/verify.py

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
-"""`authorizer verify` — health-check the local crypto setup
+"""`authorizer verify` - health-check the local crypto setup
 
 boots the local DEK, then runs envelope_crypto's self_test against the local
-keypair. if the installed envelope_crypto lacks self_test, falls back to a
+keypair (falls back to a minimal in-CLI round-trip if self_test is absent).
-minimal in-CLI round-trip. never prints key material.
+never prints key material.
 """
 
 from . import CommandError, boot_local

src/envelope_authorizer/config.py

@@ -1,11 +1,8 @@
 """TOML config loader for the authorizer CLI
 
 resolves a `.authorizer.toml` (cwd first, then ~), expands `~` and `$ENV_VARS` in
-every path field (key paths and the JSON storage path alike), and exposes typed
+every path field, and exposes typed accessors. no defaults are baked in: a
-accessors. no defaults are baked in: a missing required field raises a clear
+missing required field raises a clear error naming the field and config path.
-error naming the field and the config path that was searched. the loaded config
-is the only place key paths, identity, and storage live — this lib never imports
-a host `config` module.
 """
 
 import os

src/envelope_authorizer/storage/__init__.py

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 """storage backend resolution for the authorizer CLI
 
 `resolve(config)` reads `[storage].backend` and returns the matching sync
-StorageBackend (json or mongo). the mongo backend is guarded — importing this
+StorageBackend (json or mongo). the mongo backend is guarded - importing this
 package never requires the mongo extra; only selecting the mongo backend does.
 """
 

src/envelope_authorizer/storage/base.py

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 """abstract storage interface for authorizer key documents
 
 a backend persists key docs keyed by `_id` (the RSA fingerprint). the interface
-is intentionally sync — the CLI is a one-shot tool; an async backend (mongo)
+is intentionally sync - the CLI is a one-shot tool; an async backend (mongo)
 bridges to sync internally. `save` is an upsert by `_id`, never a duplicate-
 inserting or duplicate-raising operation.
 """

src/envelope_authorizer/storage/json_store.py

@@ -35,12 +35,7 @@ class JsonStore(StorageBackend):
         return data
 
     def _write(self, docs: List[dict]) -> None:
-        """atomically write the docs list (unique temp file then os.replace)
+        """atomically write the docs list via a unique temp file then os.replace"""
-
-        a unique temp per write (tempfile.mkstemp) keeps concurrent writers from
-        clobbering a shared `.tmp`; the temp is cleaned up if the write fails
-        before replace.
-        """
         self.path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
         fd, tmp = tempfile.mkstemp(
             dir=self.path.parent, prefix=self.path.name + ".", suffix=".tmp"
@@ -48,13 +43,12 @@ class JsonStore(StorageBackend):
         wrapped = False
         try:
             with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
-                wrapped = True  # fdopen owns fd now; its close() handles it
+                wrapped = True
                 json.dump(docs, handle, indent=2)
                 handle.write("\n")
             os.replace(tmp, self.path)
         except BaseException:
             if not wrapped:
-                # fdopen raised before taking ownership — close the raw fd ourselves
                 try:
                     os.close(fd)
                 except OSError:

src/envelope_authorizer/storage/mongo_store.py

@@ -2,15 +2,14 @@
 
 bridges the async rethink-public `mongo` lib to the sync StorageBackend: each op
 gets its own asyncio.run (connect -> op -> close), no module-level client or
-shared loop, so it never collides with a running loop. per-call connect is an
+shared loop. requires envelope_authorizer[mongo]; without it every method raises
-accepted tradeoff for a one-shot admin CLI. requires envelope_authorizer[mongo];
+a clear RuntimeError.
-without it every method raises a clear RuntimeError.
 
-fail-loud: ops go through the mongo lib's raw collection escape hatch (the motor
+fail-loud: ops go through the mongo lib's raw collection escape hatch, not the
-collection, which raises), not the swallow-and-default wrapped methods — this is
+swallow-and-default wrapped methods - this is an auth backend, so a driver error
-an auth backend, so a driver error must never read as "not initialized," and a
+must never read as "not initialized," and a no-op upsert raises instead of
-no-op upsert raises instead of silently reporting success. `close()` is
+silently reporting success. `close()` is synchronous on the mongo lib - not
-synchronous on the mongo lib — not awaited.
+awaited.
 """
 
 import asyncio