fix: EA-1 clean error on malformed flag/doc; EA-2 fingerprint ambiguity + fd-leak

EA-1: main dispatch catches KeyError/TypeError so a structurally-malformed flag/doc prints
a clean [x] line instead of a traceback. EA-2: fingerprint revoke rejects an empty prefix
and an ambiguous prefix (was: silently revoked the first match). json_store closes the raw
fd if os.fdopen raises before taking ownership (was: leaked). init TOCTOU documented as
by-design (trusted-DEK model, save upserts by _id). list '?' wording clarified.

Signed-off-by: disqualifier <dev@disqualifier.me>

src/envelope_authorizer/cli.py

@@ -94,9 +94,10 @@ def main() -> int:
         return 0
     except InvalidTag:
         return _fail("capability flag failed authentication — tampered or wrong DEK")
-    except (ConfigError, CommandError, RuntimeError, ValueError, OSError) as error:
+    except (ConfigError, CommandError, RuntimeError, ValueError, OSError, KeyError, TypeError) as error:
-        # OSError covers the FileNotFoundError/PermissionError/IsADirectoryError family
+        # OSError covers the FileNotFoundError/PermissionError/IsADirectoryError family;
-        # so an i/o failure prints a clean [✘] line instead of a traceback
+        # KeyError/TypeError cover a structurally-malformed flag/doc (unguarded indexing
+        # of ['iv']/['meta']['authorizer']/['key']) — all print a clean [✘] line, not a traceback
         return _fail(str(error))
 
 

src/envelope_authorizer/commands/init.py

@@ -11,7 +11,14 @@ from . import CommandError, build_doc, find_by_friendly, make_flag
 
 
 def run(config, storage, args) -> None:
-    """initialize the key system on this machine as the first authorizer"""
+    """initialize the key system on this machine as the first authorizer
+
+    the already-initialized / duplicate-friendly checks are non-atomic (a check-then-act
+    TOCTOU under two concurrent CLIs), but this is a one-shot human admin tool and `save`
+    upserts by `_id`, so key material can never collide — the worst case is a cosmetic
+    double-init under a race, which carries no security consequence in the trusted-
+    DEK-holder threat model. left non-atomic by design.
+    """
     if storage.get_all():
         raise CommandError(
             "already initialized; use `authorizer list` to see existing keys"

src/envelope_authorizer/commands/list_keys.py

@@ -11,7 +11,12 @@ from . import boot_local, read_flag
 
 
 def _can_authorize(crypto, doc) -> str:
-    """decrypted authority of a doc as Yes/No, or `?` if not readable here"""
+    """decrypted authority of a doc as Yes/No, or `?` if not readable here
+
+    `?` means the flag could not be read for ANY reason — the local key can't unwrap it,
+    or the doc is missing/malformed — so the table always renders rather than crashing on
+    one bad row. it is not specifically a corruption signal.
+    """
     try:
         return "Yes" if read_flag(crypto, doc["meta"]["authorizer"]) else "No"
     except Exception:

src/envelope_authorizer/commands/revoke.py

@@ -18,11 +18,18 @@ _WARNING = (
 
 
 def _find_by_fingerprint(storage, prefix: str):
-    """return the doc whose `_id` starts with the given prefix, or None"""
+    """return the single doc whose `_id` starts with the given prefix, or None
-    for doc in storage.get_all():
+
-        if doc.get("_id", "").startswith(prefix):
+    rejects an empty prefix (which would match every key) and an ambiguous prefix
-            return doc
+    that matches more than one key, rather than silently revoking the first match.
-    return None
+    """
+    if not prefix:
+        raise CommandError("fingerprint prefix must not be empty")
+    matches = [doc for doc in storage.get_all() if doc.get("_id", "").startswith(prefix)]
+    if len(matches) > 1:
+        ids = ", ".join(d["_id"][:16] for d in matches)
+        raise CommandError(f"fingerprint prefix '{prefix}' is ambiguous; matches: {ids}")
+    return matches[0] if matches else None
 
 
 def run(config, storage, args) -> None:

src/envelope_authorizer/storage/json_store.py

@@ -45,12 +45,21 @@ class JsonStore(StorageBackend):
         fd, tmp = tempfile.mkstemp(
             dir=self.path.parent, prefix=self.path.name + ".", suffix=".tmp"
         )
+        wrapped = False
         try:
             with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+                wrapped = True  # fdopen took ownership of fd; its close() handles it
                 json.dump(docs, handle, indent=2)
                 handle.write("\n")
             os.replace(tmp, self.path)
         except BaseException:
+            if not wrapped:
+                # fdopen raised before taking ownership — close the raw fd ourselves so
+                # it isn't leaked (the `with` only closes once fdopen returns a file object)
+                try:
+                    os.close(fd)
+                except OSError:
+                    pass
             try:
                 os.unlink(tmp)
             except OSError: